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1. Introduction
Studies of investment behavior have always occupied a pivotal place in western economics
literature. On the demand side, much of the literature has focused on establishing the relative merits
of the structural dynamic, Tobin Q, neoclassical, and accelerator models of investment demand, for
the most part assuming that the supply of investment finance is perfectly elastic. More recently, an
important part of the literature has concentrated on the supply side, examining the effects of potential
capital market imperfections on investment behavior of firms.
1
Investment studies also constituted a key area of comparative economics, in part because of
Stalin's and other communist leaders' preoccupation with overtaking capitalist economies by massive
capital formation.
2 The centrally planned economies indeed reported very high rates of investment
during most of their existence, although in the Soviet bloc these rates declined somewhat in the
1980s as economic growth slowed down and popular demand for consumption goods became harder
to ignore (EBRD, 1995). Moreover, the technological development of centrally planned economies
increasingly lagged behind those of capitalist countries.
3
As the transition to a market system started to unfold in the early 1990s, it became clear that
the transition economies needed to invest heavily in order to modernize their obsolete capital stock
and become competitive on world markets. The issue of how best to restructure and modernize the
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privatized firms has been a focal point in the policy debate about
optimal types of ownership and legal (corporate) structure of firms in the new market economies.
Theoretical studies have focused on strategic or deep restructuring of firms in the presence of
                                                
1 See e.g., Jorgenson (1971), Nickell (1977), Abel (1980), Abel and Blanchard (1986), Shapiro (1986), Fazzari et al.
(1988, 2000), Gertler (1988), Hayashi and Inoue (1991), Bond and Meghir (1994), Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000),
Hubbard (1998), Oliner and Rudebusch (1992), and Chirinko et al. (1999).
2 See e.g., Thornton (1970), Desai (1976), Gomulka (1978, 1986), Greene and Levine (1978), Weitzman (1979), Brada
and Hoffman (1985), and Terrell (1992, 1993).
3 The embargo imposed in the 1980s by western countries on advanced technology exports to communist economies
contributed to this technological gap.Page: 3
imperfect capital markets as a key to the transition process and they recognized investment as a
principal vehicle of this restructuring.
4 Yet, from the outset it was recognized that only productive
investment would contribute to restructuring. If firms faced soft budget constraints (willingness of
the government or some other institution to provide additional resources or otherwise bail them
out),
5 investment might reflect a waste of resources as the firms used these funds for survival rather
than restructuring. Indeed, there has been increasing concern that while direct government subsidies
have been dramatically reduced in a number of countries, indirect subsidies through the banking
system continued for the (former) SOEs on a large scale. Hence, while between 1989 and 1992 direct
government subsidies to firms as a share of GDP fell from 25 to 5 percent in the Czech and Slovak
republics, 12 to 5 percent in Poland and 11 to 3 percent in Hungary,
 6 these economies experienced
banking crises in the 1990s as the new commercial banks continued to extend loans to poorly
performing SOEs and the large privatized firms
7. The problem arose partly because under central
planning, all capital allocation was carried out by a single bank that combined the roles of a central
bank and commercial bank. At the start of the transition, this monobank system was terminated and
independent commercial banks were created, but the new banks had virtually no project appraisal
capability, some suffered from corruption and many were under government as well as “old boys
network” pressure to continue extending credit to existing client firms. During the same period, there
were also signs that newly created firms faced expensive bank finance or were denied access to bank
loans altogether. (A comparative analysis of the Czech financial may be found a special issue of the
Journal of Comparative Economics, 1997, and in EBRD, 1998).
In this paper, we analyze investment behavior using over 83,500 quarterly observations from
                                                
4 See e.g., Grosfeld and Roland (1997), Aghion, Blanchard and Burgess (1994) and Blanchard (1997).
5 See Kornai (1979, 1986, and 1998) for the introduction and discussion of the concept of a soft budget constraint.
6 See Gao and Schaffer (1998) and Basu, Estrin and Svejnar (1999).
7 In addition, Schaffer (1997) estimates that tax arrears of firms represented subsidies equal to 1-2% of GDP in the early
1990s.Page: 4
the population of about 4,000 medium and large industrial firms located in the Czech Republic
during the 1992-98 period. Our study is of special interest for five reasons.
First, our work constitutes one of the first firm-level analyses of investment behavior in the
transition economies and it focuses on one of the lead countries that serve as models for countries
that have launched their transitions later. Our findings are hence of broad interest in the context of
the transition. While a small number of earlier studies have provided valuable partial surveys of
investment in the transition economies,
8 detailed analytical studies of the investment behavior of
firms in these economies are only now being carried out.
9 Our study stands out among these few
studies because we combine several methodological approaches and use a longer (seven-year) panel
of data. This allows us to capture better the process of new investment and allow for construction
and gestation of capital.
Second, we provide evidence on the propensity to invest by ownership and legal status of
firms, and how these propensities vary over time. As might be expected, we show that the foreign-
owned companies invest the most and the (domestically owned) cooperatives the least. However,
we find little support for the “accepted wisdom” that private firms invest more than state-owned
ones. Moreover, the relative investment rate of the state-owned firms increased over time.
Third, we provide evidence on whether firms face credit rationing or a soft budget constraint
and whether the degree of rationing or softness of the budget constraint varies with firm’s ownership
and legal status. In doing so, we test one of the leading explanations of the sharp decline in
investment and output during the early transition period - Calvo and Coricelli’s (1994) credit crunch
hypothesis. We reject this hypothesis as an overall explanation. In particular, we find that
cooperatives and to a lesser extent smaller and medium sized private firms were rationed in their
access to credit, but the majority of firms, including the state-owned and larger privatized firms, werePage: 5
not. Moreover, for many of the latter firms the availability of investment funds is negatively related
to profitability. This availability of investment funds to the SOEs and larger privatized firms despite
poor performance, together with their high rate of investment, complements the evidence that Czech
banks accumulated a large amount of bad enterprise loans in the 1990s. Taken together, these
findings provide strong evidence that many large firms have been operating with a soft budget
constraint.
10
Fourth, since a key turning point in the transition process occurs when firms start behaving
like their western counterparts, we test whether the investment behavior of firms in our data set is
consistent with profit maximization. In particular, we test if the demand side of investment reflects
the neoclassical, accelerator and structural dynamic models. We find the behavior of most types of
firms to be consistent with profit maximization in both the static (neoclassical) and structural
dynamic framework. In the static context, we are also able to check if the support for the profit-
maximizing model grows over time and we find that it does. Our analysis hence shows that while
smaller firms suffer from credit rationing and larger ones have (too) easy access to bank loans, in
terms of the use of financial resources they all behave consistently with profit maximization.
Finally, our study is of methodological interest since we use a large panel of quarterly firm-
level data. We are hence able to eliminate bias introduced by data selectivity and aggregation (see
e.g., Abel and Blanchard, 1986), reduce measurement error, take into account heterogeneity across
firms and over time (see e.g., Bond and Meghir, 1994), and control for the seasonal variation in
                                                                                                                                                            
8 See e.g., Belka et al. (1994), EBRD (1995) and Eickelpasch (1995).
9 For the other studies see Lízal (1999a), Anderson and Kegels (1997) and Prasnikar and Svejnar (1998).
10 At a meeting in Paris in December 2000, the governor of the Czech National Bank announced that in 1999 full 32 %
of the total loan portfolio of the Czech banks was classified as substandard. He stated that "the problem has been most
serious in large banks (with more than 40% of their loans being classified at the end of 1999) and small Czech-owned
banks (more than 50% of their loans classified) …the public costs of the banking sector transformation have been
estimated at over CZK 250 billion, or 14% of annual GDP (plus the as yet unknown public costs of the IPB [Investment
and Postal Bank] case)." In late 2000, estimates of the cost of covering IPB losses were up to CZK 180 billion, or another
10% of Czech Republic’s GDP.Page: 6
investment. This makes our work important in the context of the growing literature on transition as
well as recent investment literature in general.
Overall, while our choice of the Czech Republic is linked to the availability of a unique data
set, an important factor for studying this case is clearly the fact that together with other countries in
Central Europe, the Czech Republic has been a pioneering transition economy. In the early 1990s,
the Czech Republic abolished central planning and carried out rapid price liberalization,
macroeconomic stabilization and widespread privatization of state-owned firms. It was one of the
most successful countries in the region in terms of macroeconomic stabilization, keeping relatively
low inflation, budget deficit, and unemployment rate.
11 As may be seen from Table 1, like the other
economies in Central Europe, the Czech Republic suffered a significant GDP decline in the first
phase of the transition, followed by a recovery in the early-to-mid 1990s. Unlike the other Central
European economies, however, the Czech Republic experienced a recession from 1997 to 1999. As
in Slovakia and Poland, the Czech investment rate fell during the economic decline of the early
1990s and rebounded thereafter. The 1997-99 recession also brought about a significant decline in
Czech Republic’s high rate of investment. However, during most of the 1990s the Czech and Slovak
investment rates were among the highest ones observed in the transition economies. Finally, like
other transition economies, the Czech Republic experienced a severe banking crisis in the mid-to-late
1990s. The crisis stemmed form excessive lending to firms for non-viable investment projects and
it was exacerbated by an underdeveloped legal framework, weak enforcement of existing laws and
high reliance of firms on bank credit for capital. Hence, understanding investment behavior of the
                                                
11 After price liberalization, the Czech Republic reduced inflation to about 10% throughout most of the 1990s, as
compared to a more gradual reduction from about 20% to 10% in Hungary, 40% to 12% in Poland and 20% to 10% in
Slovakia.  During most years in the 1990s, the Czech government ran a 1-2% budget deficit, compared to a 5-8% deficit
in Hungary, a 2-5% deficit in Poland and a 0-5% deficit in Slovakia. Finally, until the recession in the late 1990s, the
Czech Republic maintained its unemployment rate below 5%, while the unemployment rate in the other three economies
reached double digits. During the 1996-2000 recession, the Czech unemployment rate peaked at 9.8% in January 2000.Page: 7
various types of firms in the Czech Republic is useful for gaining a broader understanding of the
investment behavior and hence restructuring of firms in the transition economies in general.
2. Data and Basic Statistical Findings
The Czech Statistical Office (CSO) collected the data set we use. It covers all industrial firms
employing more than 25 people in the 1992-94 and 1997-98 periods, and all industrial firms with
more than 100 employees in 1995 and 1996. The 1998 data come from a preliminary file and do not
include all firms with fewer than 100 employees.
12 The data were collected in quarterly or monthly
intervals, depending on the size of the enterprise and the reported variables. We have combined the
monthly and quarterly data so as to maximize the number of quarterly observations. In our analysis,
we use data on total gross investment since this indicator is consistent with most existing studies of
investment in the market economies and since we do not have much information on individual
components of investment.
13
While the CSO is very professional, the data set contained some inconsistencies.
14 We have
therefore performed a number of consistency checks.
15 In imposing these consistency criteria, about
10 percent of the observations were dropped, leaving us with a data set of approximately 83,500
                                                
12 In 1995 and 1996, the Czech Statistical office temporarily changed its methodology and collected data only for firms
with 100 or more employees.
13 For firms with investment over 1 million Czech Crowns (about $30,000), we have the investment figure broken down
into tangible and intangible components. The share of intangible investment is relatively small, averaging 2.4% in 1993
and 1994, and rising to 3.9% in 1995.
14 The CSO is regarded as one of the most professional statistical offices in the former Soviet bloc.
15 These checks are similar to those used by Lízal et al. (2001) and Lízal (1999b). They are based on logical and
economic limits and definitions: firm's capital at the start and end of each quarter should be positive; the average labor
force in a given quarter should be more than 20 employees; investment should be non-negative (there were no negative
values of investment reported in our data set); production should be positive; depreciation should be positive and less
than the total capital value; investment should be smaller than the end-of-the-period capital stock; average wage should
be higher than 2000 crowns/month (minimum wage in1992); sales should be non-negative; and one-year lagged
production, sales and labor should be non-negative or missing.  We note that due to historical factors, the Czech
accounting system belongs to the Continental family of accounting systems. It is similar, though not identical to the
system of International Accounting Standards. Our checks of variable definitions indicate that the relevant data are
adequate for our analytical purposes.Page: 8
quarterly observations.
16 In terms of the total number of firms (and quarterly observations) used in
regressions, our data set covers 1867 firms (6947 quarterly observations) in the 1992-93 sub-panel,
2315 firms (7570 quarterly observations) in the 1993-44 sub-panel, 1922 firms (6991 quarterly
observations) in the 1994-95 sub-panel, 1969 firms (7349 quarterly observations) in the 1995-96
sub-panel, 1861 firms (6975 quarterly observations) in the 1996-97 sub-panel, and 1799 firms (6651
quarterly observations) in the 1997-98 sub-panel.
As may be seen in Table 2, our data contain important information about the ownership and
legal status (form) of the firms. Unfortunately, we cannot exploit this information in a panel format
since changes in the legal status and frequently also ownership resulted in changed identification
numbers of firms. We identify firms by their identification numbers, and changes in the legal status
or ownership are from our standpoint indistinguishable from the births of new firms, breakups and
spin-offs, or mergers.
17 While the inability to track the evolution of ownership and legal form over
time imposes limits on our analysis, we are nevertheless able to exploit the ownership and legal form
information in a number of ways.
The CSO classified firms into ownership categories by majority ownership. Hence a firm is
for instance classified as being privately owned if it is more than fifty percent privately owned. When
none of the types of owners (private owners, cooperative members, state, or foreign owners) have
a majority stake, the firm is classified as having mixed ownership.
The legal status reflects the particular type of corporate governance and legal obligations
associated with each form of registration. It also captures the relative financial and bureaucratic ease
                                                
16 One large firm that met the nine criteria reported a 90 percent drop in output during the third quarter of 1993. This
deviation affected the summary statistics (see, e.g., the large coefficient and standard deviation in 1993:Q3
investment/production in Table 3) and some regression estimates. We have therefore eliminated this observation from
the data set. Data on capital stock are unavailable for 1992, and we thus use the 1992 data only for estimations that do
not require the capital stock variable. Finally, it should be noted that the consistency checks revealed that data quality
was improving slightly over the 1992-98 period.
17 Changes in firm size that do not induce changes in the identification number are controlled for by including the capital
stock as a scaling variable.Page: 9
of establishing a given type of firm. Understanding the legal (corporate) status is important because
different countries placed different emphasis on privatization and corporatization of state-owned
firms during the transition. For instance, while the Czech Republic and Russia focused on rapid
privatization, Poland stressed early corporatization and slower privatization of state-owned firms.
The relative merits of these different approaches continue to be debated.
In the Czech Republic, as in other Central European countries, individual, cooperative and
limited liability categories tend to contain smaller firms that were started with relatively low initial
capital base. In contrast, joint-stock companies tend to be larger in size. The state-owned and mixed
ownership firms each have a similar average firm size in both the limited liability and joint-stock
legal status. Finally, state-owned/state-enterprises tend to be relatively small, averaging less than
one-half of the employees of other state-owned firms.
18 Corporate governance in smaller firms is
relatively straightforward as ownership and management usually overlap. In state-controlled firms
the government appoints and controls managers, while in private firms the decisions are made by the
largest shareholder(s). Finally, in cooperatives the managers are elected by all coop members.
From Table 2 it is clear that in terms of the number of quarterly observations, the most
important ownership-legal status category is that of privately-owned/limited liability companies
(28,697 observations). It is followed by state-owned/joint-stock companies (12,170), privately-
owned/joint stock companies (9,091), state-owned/state-enterprises (7,154), foreign-owned/limited
liability companies (5,995), cooperatively-owned/cooperatives (5,461), privately-owned/individual
businesses (5,355), mixed ownership/joint-stock companies (5,226), and foreign-owned/joint-stock
companies (2,218). These nine categories, plus mixed ownership/limited liability firms (652), state-
owned/limited liability companies (616), and "other firms" category constitute the twelve types of
firms whose investment behavior we analyze.Page: 10
Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix give the evolution over time of the numbers of
observations in the legal status and ownership categories, respectively. Taking into account the fact
that firms with fewer than 100 employees were excluded from the data set in 1995, 1996 and to some
extent also in1998, we see from Table A1 that there was an expected decrease in the number and
share of state enterprises and an increase in the number and share of limited liability, individual and
joint stock companies. The number of cooperatives appears to have stayed steady or declined slightly
between the early 1990s and 1998. In terms of ownership, the data in Table A2 complement the
picture by showing that the number and share of state-owned firms declined between the early and
late 1990s, while the number and share of foreign, mixed and domestic privately-owned firms
increased. The number of cooperatives again appears to have held steady or declined slightly
between the early 1990s and 1998.
The distribution of observations across industries, not reported in a tabular form, is quite
broad, with 15 percent of observations being in the food industry, 13 percent in the machinery
industry, 12 percent in the metal product industry, 7 percent in the furniture industry, and 6 percent
in the processing of non-metallic minerals and textile industries. Each of the remaining industry
groups has less than 5 percent of all observations.
The summary statistics of the most relevant variables are presented in Tables 3 and 4. As
may be seen from Table 3, investment/production and investment/labor ratios show an increase over
time, although the pattern is not as steady as in the aggregate data in Table 1. The discrepancy is
brought about by the fact that small firms are excluded from our micro data in 1995, 1996 and to
some extent also in 1998, and by the fact that the aggregate investment figures in Table 1 contain
significant infrastructure investment carried out by the government. The data in Table 3 also show
                                                                                                                                                            
18 Detailed descriptive tables may be obtained from the authors upon request.Page: 11
a seasonal pattern with a fourth quarter peak, reflecting an end-of-the-year investment spree.
19 It is
interesting that the communist era phenomenon of "spending funds before the year's end" is reflected
in the investment behavior of firms well into the transition.
20
Profit is defined as all revenues minus accrued costs. The data in Table 3 show that average
profits were positive in all years during the 1992-98 period. There was also substantial quarterly and
annual variation in average profits during this period, as was the variance of profits across firms in
each quarter. In an opposite pattern to investment, there was a downward trend in profits across
quarters in all years during the 1993-98 period, with profit reaching negative values in the last
quarter of 1993 and 1995-98. Overall, the post 1992 transition has not been associated with declining
profits, as may have been the case in the 1989-92 period (Blanchard, 1997, pp. 64-6). This finding,
together with the consideration of the appropriateness and availability of data, has led us to use profit
as a measure of the firm’s availability of internal funds for investment.
In panels A-C of Table 4, we present for each of the 13 ownership-legal status categories of
firms the annual evolution of the propensity to invest, as captured by the investment/capital,
investment/labor and investment/production ratio, respectively. The foreign-owned/limited liability
and joint-stock companies are a rapidly growing group of firms and they record some of the highest
values of the three ratios in most years. These two findings based on micro evidence make us argue
that foreign-owned firms are a major conduit of investment and innovations into the transition
economies such as the Czech Republic. The domestic privately-owned/joint-stock companies are not
far behind the foreign-owned companies, however, and they dominate the foreign/owned limited
liability companies on some of the investment indicators in several years. Moreover, while the state-
                                                
19 The seasonal pattern is much more pronounced in net investment than in depreciation, as shown by Lízal and Svejnar
(2001).
20 A more detailed examination indicates that the cyclical nature of investment is systematically reflected in the behavior
of joint-stock companies of all ownership types and, to a lesser extent, of state-owned/state-enterprise and foreign-
owned/limited liability firms.Page: 12
owned/joint-stock companies (the second most numerous group of firms) do not record high
investment/capital ratios, they rank fifth out of thirteen on investment/labor in most years and move
from the sixth to third place in investment/production between 1992 and 1998. Similarly, the state-
owned/limited liability companies register some of the highest investment/production ratios in the
early-to-mid 1990s, while ranking relatively low in terms of investment/capital. The low
investment/capital ratio found in state-owned firms may hence indicate that these firms continue to
report in their accounting books the value of capital from the centrally planned period, rather than
writing some of it off as obsolete and unproductive. In contrast, the privately-owned/limited liability
firms (the single most numerous category of firms) and individually registered firms rank high in
terms of investment/capital but low in the other two indicators, suggesting that these smaller private
firms operate with a small (recorded) capital stock and do not invest heavily relative to their output
and employment. Finally, cooperatives and state-owned/state-enterprises record the lowest
investment ratios for all indicators in virtually every year.
21
The statistics reported in Tables 4A-C hence indicate that foreign companies generally tend
to invest the most and cooperatives the least. The behavioral difference between the private and
state-owned firms is more complex. Private firms clearly invest more than the state-owned ones
relative to their recorded capital stock and the private joint-stock companies (the large private firms)
also tend to invest a bit more than the state-owned/joint-stock companies on all three criteria.
However, in the early-to-mid 1990s state-owned/limited liability companies dominated all domestic
private firms in terms of the investment/production ratio and throughout the 1990s the most
numerous private/limited liability companies and the private individually registered firms tended to
invest relatively little per output and per worker. The widely accepted Polish survey findings by
                                                
21 It should be noticed that a large number of small firms (especially private/limited liability and in lesser extent
private/individual businesses) did not report capital (see Tables 4A and 4B). This is because the forms that smaller firms
were required to fill out for the CSO focused on variables related to the income statement rather than the balance sheets.Page: 13
Belka et al. (1994), indicating that during transition investment is high in the new private firms and
low in the state-owned enterprises, is hence not supported by our large Czech data set. Finally, it
must be noted that some of the highest investment ratios are recorded in the mixed ownership and
"other" categories of firms.
3.  The Estimating Framework
We estimate several equations that allow us to explore the issues mentioned in the
introduction and also permit us to compare our results to those obtained for western economies. On
the demand side, we use two specifications. The first one corresponds to the basic neoclassical and
accelerator models of investment demand (see e.g., Jorgenson, 1971). These models are internally
consistent and have been widely used in the western context. They allow us to check if the behavior
of firms in the transition is consistent with the profit maximization hypothesis inherent in these
models. The models are based on somewhat restrictive assumptions about input substitutability (the
accelerator model) or speed of adjustment (the neoclassical model), however, and we therefore also
estimate an Euler equation that is derived explicitly from a dynamic structural model of investment
demand. The Euler equation enables us to assess whether the firms display behavior that is consistent
with dynamic profit maximization.
22
On the supply side, we use a specification that allows us to test whether the firm's availability
of internal and external funds affects its investment decisions. In particular, our discussion of
imperfections in the newly established banking sector and the possible presence of a soft budget
constraint make us hypothesize that the cooperatives and individually-owned or limited liability
companies, which tend to be smaller and many of which are newly formed, could be expected to be
                                                
22 This is a rather strict test since even in western empirical applications the model has often encountered problems of
convergence or generated counter-intuitive parameter values (Bond and Meghir, 1994). However, the model representsPage: 14
more rationed in their access to financial resources than the joint-stock companies that tend to be
large and well established, or the foreign-owned firms that can obtain investment financing from
other countries. Moreover, we expect that current and privatized state-owned enterprises may display
behavior that is consistent with a soft budget constraint.
In terms of actual specification, on the demand side we start with the accelerator and
neoclassical models, as developed and used by Koyck (1954), Jorgenson (1966), Kopcke (1985) and
others. The capital accumulation constraint is given by
Kt = (1 - δ)Kt-1 + It,
where Kt is the current period capital stock, It = It
Gross = It
Net + It
Replacement and hence It
Net = It - δKt-1.
Denoting output by Yt and the optimal level of capital by Kt
*, the flexible accelerator (Koyck) model
assumes that each period a proportion λ of the gap Kt - Kt
* between the actual and optimal level of
capital is closed. The model further assumes that Kt
* = µYt and net investment is hence given by
It
Net = λ(Kt
* - Kt-1) = λµYt - λKt-1, implying that the actual level of capital may be expressed as
Kt = λµYt + (1-λ)Kt-1.
Substituting this expression into the equations for Kt-1, Kt-2,..., one obtains
Kt = µ[λYt + λ(1- λ)Yt-1 + λ(1- λ)
2Yt-2 + λ(1- λ)
3Yt-3 + ....], (1)
which yields the corresponding net investment equation in first differences:
 It
Net = Kt - Kt-1 = ∆Kt = µ[λ∆Yt + λ(1- λ)∆Yt-1 + λ(1- λ)
2∆Yt-2 + λ(1- λ)
3∆Yt-3 + ....].
We can substitute back into the gross investment relationship to obtain
 It = Kt - (1 - δ)Kt-1 = λµYt + (δ - λ)Kt-1. (2)
While it is possible to proceed further in rearranging equation (2), the resulting specification tends
to suffer from autocorrelated error terms.
23 We hence use equations (1) and (2). Since this
                                                                                                                                                            
an appealing alternative to empirical specifications relying on Tobin's Q since financial markets are not yet efficient and
adequate data for constructing the values of Q hence do not exist in the transition economies.
23 Note that since equation (2) holds also for t-1, it follows thatPage: 15
specification requires the adjustment process to be a distributed lag (and hence the coefficients to
decline according to a geometric pattern), we follow the literature and relax this restriction. In
particular, we build on equations (1) and (2) by experimenting with specific numbers of lagged terms
of output without imposing restrictions on their coefficients:
It = k + Σbi Yt-i + cKt-1 + et i=0,1,2,...,m      (3)
Where k is a constant, e is the error term and equation (3) may also be viewed as a special case of
Jorgenson’s rational lag function.
In a neoclassical model we arrive at equation such as (3) by assuming that the firm
maximizes a profit function
πt = ptYt - wtLt - ctKt
subject to a neoclassical production function Yt = f(Kt, Lt), where capital Kt and labor Lt are
substitutable, p is the output price, w is the wage, and c is the user cost of capital. The maximization
results in the standard first order conditions equating the marginal product of labor to the wage and
the marginal product of capital to its user cost. This approach requires one to specify the production
function and define the user cost of capital. Depending on the production function, a general form
of the estimating investment equation is of the form
 It = k + Σbi (p/c)t-i Yt-i - Σdi (p/c)t-i Yt-i-1 + δKt-1 + et i=0,1,2,...m.
If one considers a one-period investment ordering (investment requiring one period to be fully
installed) in the context of a Cobb-Douglas production function Y  =  K
θL
1-θ, one obtains
θ(Yt/Kt) = ct/pt and Kt
* = θ(p/c)tYt. The net investment is then given by
                                                                                                                                                            
It-1 = Kt-1 - (1 - δ)Kt-2 = λµYt-1 + (δ - λ)Kt-2
and by multiplying each side by (1 - δ) and subtracting the resulting equation from (2) one obtains
It - (1 - δ)It-1 = λµYt - (1 - δ) λµYt-1 + (δ - λ)Kt-1 - (1 - δ)(δ - λ)Kt-2.
This equation may in turn be rewritten as
It - (1 - δ)It-1 = λµYt - (1 - δ) λµYt-1 + (δ - λ)It-1
since It = Kt - (1 - δ)Kt-1 implies It-1 = Kt-1 - (1 - δ)Kt-2. Rearranging and collecting the It-1 terms yields:
It = λµYt - (1 - δ) λµYt-1 + (1 - λ)It-1.Page: 16
 It
net = ∆Kt
* = θ(p/c)t(Yt -Yt-1) = θ(p/c)t Yt - θ(p/c)t Yt-1,
while gross investment is given by an equation that is of the same form as equation (3):
It = Σgi θ(p/c)t-i Yt-i + δKt-1 + et,               i=0,1,2,...m. (3')
where Σgi  = 1 (i=0,1,2,...m), if no investment orders were canceled.
The neoclassical and accelerator models embedded in equations (3) and (3') are usually
operationalized by relating a firm's investment/capital ratio to its output/capital ratio:
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where the interpretation of γ's depends on whether the underlying theory refers to the neoclassical
or accelerator models and m is the number of lags. In our empirical work, we also control for the
output price to user cost of capital ratio by including firm-specific fixed effects and time dummy
variables, and by estimating the equation separately for the different categories of firms.
Equation (4) reflects the firm's demand for investment and it implicitly assumes that the
supply of investment funds is perfectly elastic. In accounting for the possibility that the firm faces
transaction costs or restrictions in obtaining external financing, the usual approach in the investment
literature is to augment this type of equation by one or more cash-flow variables such as profit. Since
Czech firms were required to pay for internally financed investment from retained profits and our
data set contains information on profit for most firms in most of the time periods, we examine the
link of investment to this variable. In the studies of advanced market economies, a positive
coefficient on profit (cash-flow) is usually interpreted as an indication that firms are credit rationed
since in a perfect capital market the firm and lender would be indifferent between internal and
external financing and the coefficient on profit would hence be zero.
                                                                                                                                                            
The advantage of this resulting investment equation is that it does not require data on capital stock. However, since it
contains lagged dependent variable, the error process tends to be correlated, leading to inconsistency problem in OLS.
24 Note that the usual assumption on the form of heteroskedasticity of et leads to scaling with the reciprocal of capital.
We therefore use εt to denote the transformed residuals.Page: 17
We note that in the transition context the inclusion of the profit variable as a regressor allows
one also to test the soft budget constraint hypothesis. In particular, since firms have used bank credit
extensively as their principal and almost exclusive form of external financing, a zero coefficient on
profit signals that firms have access to bank credit for investment irrespective of their profitability,
which as we saw earlier ranges from highly positive to highly negative. In the presence of high
investment rates and rapid accumulation of non-performing enterprise loans by the banks, this non-
discriminatory supply of bank funds to firms signals the presence of a soft budget constraint for the
poorly performing firms. We also formulate a stronger version of the soft budget constraint
hypothesis, namely that the coefficient on profit is negative. This strong version reflects the case
where poorly performing firms get a better access to bank loans and invest more, ceteris paribus,
than profitable firms.
25
During some quarters we are missing either profit, capital or investment data for some of the
firms and since our final specification requires at least five quarters of consecutive presence in the
data, the set of firms on which we run the investment equation is hence somewhat smaller than the
original one. In order to control for possible selection bias stemming from this switch to a smaller
data set, we first run a Heckman-type probit equation, predicting the probability of the firm being
included in the sample on the basis of output, profit, industry dummy variables and firm type
variables. The resulting inverse Mills ratio is included as an explanatory variable in the investment
equation:
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 Π ∑ (5)
where Π denotes gross profit, M the inverse Mills ratio from the probit estimation and X a set of
quarterly (and in the case of longer panels also annual) dummy variables. Naturally, βs and γs are
                                                
25 For another possible manifestation of the soft budget constraint, namely in the form of higher wages, see Prasnikar andPage: 18
the parameters of our main interest, with vector Ψ and µ being other parameters to be estimated. We
have run pre-tests with varying numbers of lags. Since we have quarterly data, we have focused on
models with the number of lags equal to or greater than four. The results for four or more lags are
similar and we hence report findings based on m=4.
26 In order to control for firm-specific
heterogeneity, we estimate equation (5) using a fixed effects (mean deviation or within group)
specification. As is customary in the literature, we assume that the lagged values of the regressors
are exogenous.
As mentioned earlier, we also estimate an investment equation that corresponds to a
structural model of dynamic optimization by firms in the presence of adjustment costs:
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where w denotes the wage, L is employment and  ϕ s are parameters. Since models such as the one
in equation (6) have a lagged dependent variable as a regressor and need a substantial time
dimension for convergence (see e.g., Bond and Meghir, 1994), we estimate equation (6) on the
deviations from the mean using the whole panel. We use the first and second powers of the
deviations from the mean of the twice lagged labor/capital ratio, the wage interacted with the
labor/capital ratio, the output per worker minus the wage interacted with the labor/capital ratio, and
the output/capital ratio as instruments for the right-hand side variables.
27
                                                                                                                                                            
Svejnar (1998). The particular form of the soft budget constraint hence depends on institutional environments.
26 We have also estimated equations with a four-quarter difference specification and found the results to be similar to
those obtained with four quarterly lags. However, the four-quarter difference specification by construction shortens our
panel by additional four periods and is more demanding on the completeness of the firm presence in the time dimension.
27 The Euler equation models require a large time dimension to converge to consistent estimates even if the number of
firms is large because in the presence of aggregate shocks the error term contains a prediction error that averages to zero
over time but not over firms. This need for a long time span is a major problem in empirical studies of investment since
there are usually fewer than twenty time observations. We have only seven-year data and the high seasonality of quarterly
observations effectively wipes out the advantage of longer time dimension of the panel (Lízal, 1999b, examines the
effects of such seasonality in a simpler setup for depreciation). As could be expected in this situation, when we carry out
the estimation separately for the major ownership-legal status groups, the estimates generate high standard errors and
unreasonable mean values of parameters. The need for a larger cross-sectional dimension in the presence of a limitedPage: 19
Equation (6) is appealing because it provides evidence on the consistency of enterprise
behavior during the transition with a model of profit maximization in the presence of cost of
adjustment. As mentioned earlier, this is valuable because a key turning point in the transition occurs
when the behavior of firms starts approximating that of a firm in a market economy. We use the
investment setting to provide micro-econometric evidence on this issue. In particular, omitting for
simplicity the firm subscript i, equation (6) may be derived from the maximization of the present
discounted value of firm's expected profits Vt as follows:
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The term E[.│Ωt] denotes the expectation conditional on all information available at the time t, Πt
is the expected profit at time t, ξt+j is the discount factor between period t and t+j (assuming that
payments are made at the beginning of each period), r is the discount rate, δ is the depreciation rate,
p is output price, F(.,.) is a strictly concave (unobservable) frontier production function, G(.,.) is a
strictly convex (unobservable) cost of capital adjustment function, Y(.,.,.) = F(.,.) - G(.,.) is the firm's
observable production, and a and b are parameters of the cost of the capital adjustment function.
29
The term pt
IIt is used instead of the usual "capital rental" on the assumption that investment is paid
for at the time of purchase.
                                                                                                                                                            
number of time observations has led us to estimate the Euler equation jointly on all observations, allowing the ownership-
legal status effects to be captured as different intercepts.
28 See also Matyas and Severstre (1992) or Bond and Meghir (1994) for related derivations.
29 In the classical setup, the production function F(.,.) and the adjustment cost function G(.,.) are assumed to be additively
separable.Page: 20
In this setting, the firm's optimal investment problem can be restated as a dynamic
programming problem with a single state variable Kt and single control variable It:
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Assuming that the production function F(.,.) is homogeneous of degree 1 in labor and capital and that
the firm has rational expectations, one can differentiate equation (11) with respect to the choice
variables Kt, Lt and It to obtain equation (6) after algebraic manipulations.
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4. Empirical Estimates
In Table 5, we present our overall estimates of equation (5), which allow us to capture the
importance of the neoclassical-accelerator and the internal funds-soft budget constraint models. The
estimates are based on 1992-98 quarterly data for the twelve principal categories of firms and the
coefficients give the total effects of the four lagged output and profit variables.
32
As may be seen from the Table 5, the sum of the coefficients on output is positive and
statistically significant for all categories of firms except for the mixed/limited liability group (thirty-
four firms), where the coefficient is –0.003 and statistically insignificant. As might be expected from
these individual results, the overall regression using pooled data from all firms generates a positive
and statistically significant coefficient on output as well. The sum of coefficients on profit is also
positive in the overall regression based on pooled observations from all firms, but among the
individual categories of firms it is positive and significant in only five of the twelve categories. All
the remaining coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant, except for the coefficient on
private/individual firms, which is negative and significant.
                                                
30 We assume that capital can be changed only through investment and the investment decision is made at the beginning
of each period.
31 In the present derivation, we assume that the labor input may be adjusted costlessly. This assumption may be relaxed
with no influence on the core of our derivation. See e.g., Estrin and Svejnar (1993) for the derivation and estimation of
a model with adjustment costs of labor.Page: 21
The estimates in Table 5 hence indicate that the neoclassical-accelerator model, reflecting
firm behavior that is consistent with profit maximization, receives a fairly uniform support from
virtually all categories of firms. The credit-rationing hypothesis is supported by data from the three
categories of mostly smaller firms (private/limited liability companies, cooperatives and
foreign/limited liability firms) and also from the category of state-owned/joint stock firms. The
finding that investment in smaller firms varies positively with firm’s profit could be expected in an
underdeveloped financial market where smaller firms do not have easy access to bank capital and
are unlikely to benefit from a soft budget constraint since they are not former state-owned firms. The
positive coefficient on profit in the category of state-owned/joint stock firms points to the absence
of a soft budget constraint in these firms, but a more complex picture emerges as we address this
issue with more disaggregated data below. All except one of the remaining categories contain
primarily larger firms and generate insignificant coefficients on profit, a finding that is consistent
with a lack of credit rationing and the presence of a soft budget constraint. Following on our earlier
discussion, the soft budget constraint is consistent with these findings if some firms encounter
difficulties selling their output at a profit, but receive bank loans even if they produce at a loss. If
profitable firms in the same categories also have access to bank credit, one may find a positive
coefficient on output (the firms produce and invest) and an insignificant coefficient on profit (banks
provide investment funds irrespective of profitability). Finally, the negative profit coefficient in
private/individual firms, while consistent with the strong soft budget constraint hypothesis, most
likely stems from the fact that many of these firms are newly created entities whose investment
occurs in the start-up stage in their life cycle when their profit is low or negative. We next examine
these issues in more detail.
                                                                                                                                                            
32 The 1992 data are used for lagged values of regressors. The underlying individual coefficients may be obtained from
the authors upon request.Page: 22
Our strategy is to generate first separate estimates for larger and smaller firms to see if
investment behavior varies with size across the various categories of firms. We divide the firms into
two groups: those with 100 or more workers and those with fewer than 100 workers. This division
also allows us to take into account the fact that our data do not cover firms with fewer than 100
workers in 1995, 1996 and to some extent in 1998. In particular, by generating estimates for firms
with 100 and more workers in all years, we can assess the impact of the aforementioned change in
statistical coverage.
As may be seen from the top panel of Table 6, the estimates of equation (5) for firms with
100 and more workers are very similar to those obtained for all firms in Table 5.
33 The corresponding
coefficients have identical signs in all cases except for the profit coefficient in privately-
owned/individual firms, where firms with 100 and more workers display a statistically insignificant
coefficient, as compared to the negative coefficient found in the combined group of large and small
firms. As might be expected, the negative and statistically significant coefficient is found in the
smaller privately-owned/individual firms in the lower panel of Table 6. Since these small firms tend
to be more recent start-ups than their larger counterparts, the findings in Table 6 suggest that it is the
small (rather than both small and large) privately-owned/individual firms that are observed during
the start-up stage of their life cycle when they invest heavily and their profit is low or negative.
Interestingly, while both small and large cooperatives appear to be credit rationed, private and
foreign limited liability companies display credit rationing only among the larger firms. With these
caveats in mind, we can conclude that the estimates based on all data are quite similar to those for
larger firms.
                                                
33 In this estimation, we have left out the three categories of firms that have too few observations when divided into the
two size groups – state-owned/limited liability enterprises, mixed/limited liability companies and other firms.Page: 23
Since investment behavior is likely to have undergone changes as the firms proceeded
through the transition process, we have also estimated equation (5) separately for each year.
34 As
may be seen from Table 7, the separate annual estimates for 1993-98 show considerable variation
in investment behavior over time.
35 Moreover, in examining the raw data, we have detected
significant movements of firms across categories during certain years. As we show presently, it is
essential to use this information in evaluating changes in the estimated coefficients over time.
The overall regression (based on observations from all firms) in Table 7 generates a positive
coefficient on total output in all six years, while the effect of profit is negative in 1993 and 1996,
statistically insignificant in 1994 and positive in 1995, 1997 and 1998. In the aggregate, production
hence drove investment in each year, while profitability was negatively related or unrelated to
investment in the early 1990s, and primarily positively related in the second half of the 1990s. In
examining the coefficients in the individual categories of firms, one finds in Table 7 (as in Table 5)
that there are more positive (statistically significant) coefficients on output than on profit. The data
are also increasingly supportive of the neoclassical-accelerator model as the transition proceeds, in
that the number of categories of firms with positive coefficients on output increases (almost but not
quite monotonically) from three in 1993 to eight in 1998. In contrast, the number of categories of
firms with a positive coefficient on profit varies between one and four and while it increases over
time, the pattern is not particularly strong. Hence, most coefficient estimates on profit are consistent
with the soft budget constraint.
The support of the neoclassical-accelerator model also becomes evident when one notes that
the categories of firms whose behavior is consistent with this model are the most numerous ones and
increasingly so over time. Hence, while slightly over one-half of firms belonged to the categories that
                                                
34 As in Tables 5 and 6, in Table 7 we report the total effects of output and profit. The individual coefficients for each
of the lagged values of output and profit may be obtained from the authors upon request.
35 In all sets of regressions, the 1992 data are used as lagged values of 1993 regressors.Page: 24
conformed to this model in 1993 and 1994, by 1998 the proportion rose to almost 100%. The
categories of firms whose coefficient estimates are consistent with the credit-rationing model account
for about one-third of firms in each of the six years, while two-thirds of firms therefore have
estimates that are consistent with the soft budget constraint hypothesis.
In examining the coefficients of individual categories of firms in Table 7, we take into
account year-to-year movements of ten or more firms across the ownership/legal status categories.
There was no such movement between 1992 and 1993, and the 1993 estimates reflect the
categorization of firms just before the first wave of large-scale privatization.
36 A particularly
interesting finding for 1993 is that the estimated coefficients on profit for state-owned/joint stock
companies and state-owned/state enterprises are negative. This suggests that in 1992-93 these two
largest groups of firms (accounting for over fifty percent of all industrial firms at the time) were
operating under a strong version of the soft budget constraint in that investment was negatively
related to profit.
37 The negative coefficient on profit changes to zero for these two categories of firms
in 1994 and actually turns positive for state/joint ventures in 1995, before becoming again negative
for both sets of firms in 1996.
38 This suggests that the nature of the credit constraint of the state-
owned firms changed over time, showing little sign of being restrictive and some sign of being quite
soft in at least two years.
                                                
36 Czech mass privatization proceeded in several stages. Between 1990 and 1991, various properties valued between $2.5
billion and $4.2 billion were restituted to previous owners. Between 1991 and 1993, small firms were sold for about $1
billion in the so-called small-scale privatization program. The most important method by which most medium and large
state-owned enterprises were privatized was the large-scale privatization program, which accounted for about $30 billion
in asset value. In order to handle the large number of firms, the large-scale privatization program was divided into two
waves, with the first wave occurring between 1992 and 1993, and the second wave between 1993 and 1995. The large-
scale privatization program employed a variety of privatization methods, including direct sales and transfer of shares to
the population at large.
37 As mentioned earlier, there is also a negative coefficient on profit in the case of private/individual firms. This is most
likely associated with the heavy investment in the early phase of the life cycle of these firms when profit is low or
negative.
38 The state-owned firms became numerically relatively insignificant in 1997 and especially 1998.Page: 25
In interpreting changes in the estimated coefficients over time, one must take into account
the fact that between 1993 and 1994, sixty-eight firms moved out of the state-owned/joint stock
category of firms, with forty firms going to the private/joint stock and twenty-eight to the mixed/joint
stock category. Moreover, one hundred and forty firms moved from the category of state-owned/state
enterprises to other categories that we cannot identify.
39 Overall, the number of firms in the
private/joint stock and mixed/joint stock categories virtually doubled in 1994, primarily due to the
influx of former state-owned firms. The fact that the estimated coefficient on profit for the
mixed/joint stock firms turns from being insignificant in 1993 to negative in 1994 hence suggest that
the incoming firms were those that operated under the strong soft budget constraint and continued
to do so a year later under mixed ownership. Hence, while some of the changes in coefficient
estimates could signal moderation of state-owned banks in providing credit to unprofitable firms,
some were brought about by the switch of firms across ownership/legal status categories.
40 In
addition, it should be noted that the number of private/limited liability companies almost doubled
between 1993 and 1994, and the firms also registered a negative coefficient on profit in 1994. Some
of the new firms may be the former state-owned/state enterprises operating under the strong version
of the soft budget constraint, while others are newly created firms that invest heavily during the start-
up period when profits are low or negative. Finally, the number of foreign/joint stock companies
increased by over one-third between 1993 and 1994, and these firms display a positive 1994
coefficient on profit.
                                                
39 State enterprises were assigned a new identification number as they switched their legal status.
40 Between 1993 and 1994, thirty-three firms also moved into the category of state-owned/joint stock companies, with
eighteen coming from the private/joint stock and fifteen from mixed/joint stock category. The movement into state
ownership could reflect a number of phenomena, including an increase in the firm’s basic capital, with the state becoming
a majority owner by contributing more than the other owner(s) of the firm. As mentioned above, throughout the 1990s
there was also a movement of firms from the state-owned/state enterprise category, much of which went to the state-
owned/joint stock company group. The reader can surmise this flow from the changes in the number of firms in these
two categories over the years. However, since this switch was accompanied by a change in the firm’s identification
number, we cannot detect it directly.Page: 26
No firms moved across categories between 1994 and 1995 except for firms that moved from
the state-owned/state enterprise category to other unidentifiable groups. During the 1994-95 period,
the Czech economy also achieved the most rapid rate of growth of GDP (6%) in all of the 1990s. In
our 1995 estimates we do not observe any significant negative profit coefficients, although the
coefficients for private/joint stock firms and state-owned/state enterprises are zero and hence
consistent with the soft budget constraint. Interestingly, we find a positive coefficient on profit for
state and mixed/joint stock firms, as well as for private/limited liability firms and cooperatives. With
the economy booming and the Czech Prime Minister declaring the transition to be over, the banks
may have hardened the budget constraint for some categories of firms.
In 1996-99 the Czech economy experienced an unexpected recession and in 1996 the banks
again relaxed the budget constraint for state-owned firms, in part under political pressure. With
hundreds of firms moving from state to mixed and private ownership between 1995 and 1996, the
estimates for 1996 in Table 7 indicate that investment was again negatively related to profits in state
and mixed/joint stock companies, as well as in state-owned/state enterprises.
41  Between 1996 and
1997, over one hundred and fifty firms moved from state and mixed ownership to the private/joint
stock category, where the 1997 and 1998 coefficients on profit turned negative. It is likely that this
switch to a strong soft budget constraint in the private/joint stock firms in 1997-98 reflected the
sizable inflow of firms that operated under a strong soft budget constraint in their original categories
of firms in 1996. At the same time, as the banking crisis developed in 1997-98, cooperatives and to
a lesser extent also private/limited liability companies appear to have operated under a credit crunch.
Overall, the disaggregated annual estimates in Table 7 suggest that during most of the 1993-
98 period, the current and former state-owned firms operated under a soft budget constraint. In
                                                
41 However, it was positive in private/joint stock and (the few) private/individual firms.Page: 27
contrast, cooperatives and to a lesser extent the private/limited liability companies appear to have
been credit rationed.
As the last step in our analysis of the soft budget constraints, we have checked various
measures of the propensity to invest of profitable and unprofitable firms. We started by comparing
annual data on the investment/capital, investment/output and investment/labor ratios of firms with
positive and negative annual profit. We found that the difference was statistically insignificant for
all three measures in all years. Second, to eliminate the effect of outliers we replicated these tests for
trimmed samples, where we only compared profitable and loss making firms that were within two
standard deviations of their respective means. Again, we found the difference to be statistically
insignificant for all three measures in all years. Third, in order to check if the difference in
investment rates between profitable and loss-making firms only reveals itself over a period of several
years, we took firms that were present in our sample for at least six years and we compared a six-year
cumulative propensity to invest of firms that had positive total profit and those that had negative total
profit over the six-year period. Having found no statistically significant differences among these two
groups of firms, we then sharpened the test by comparing only the highly profitable and highly loss
making firms in this sample.
42 While the highly profitable firms had somewhat higher mean
investment rates than the loss making firms, we again could not reject the hypothesis that the rates
were the same.
43 Our findings hence indicate that the loss-making firms had long-term access to
capital and on average were able to maintain investment rates that were comparable with those of
profitable firms. This is strong complementary evidence that loss making firms operated under soft
                                                
42 The highly profitable firms were defined as those with cumulative capital-weighted profits greater than 1 (cumulative
profits exceeded the value of capital), while the highly loss making firms had cumulative capital weighted profits less
than –1 (cumulative losses exceeded the value of capital).
43 For example, the six-year investment to output ratios and corresponding standard errors were 0.08 (0.08) for the highly
profitable firms and 0.06 (0.06) for the highly loss-making firms.Page: 28
budget constraints and it is consistent with the observed lack of corporate bankruptcies in the Czech
Republic in the 1990s.
Finally, in Table 8 we present estimated coefficients of the dynamic structural model based
on our entire sample of firms. The model includes quarterly and ownership/legal form dummy
variables and the inverse Mills ratio. In view of the difficulties that are frequently encountered in
estimating this type of a model, our estimates are very encouraging since the three structural
coefficients φ1, φ2 and φ3 have the theoretically predicted signs and are statistically significant. In
addition to providing support to the static neoclassical-accelerator model, the Czech data from the
post 1992 phase of the transition hence suggest that in terms of investment the firms started behaving
consistently with inter-temporal profit maximization.
5. Conclusions
Strategic restructuring of firms is viewed as key to a successful transition from plan to
market, with investment under a hard budget constraint being a principal form of this restructuring.
In this paper, we have used the population of medium-sized and large industrial firms operating in
the Czech Republic between 1992 and 1998 to analyze the investment behavior of firms with various
types of ownership and legal (corporate) status. Ours is one of the first studies in this area, and it
differs from other studies in that we (1) examine the validity of the main competing models of
investment in the transition context, (2) test for the presence of credit rationing and a soft budget
constraint, (3) assess whether investment behavior of firms changes as the transition proceeds and
whether it varies with a firm's ownership and legal status, (4) use quarterly rather than annual data
in the presence of seasonal variation in investment, and (5) apply panel data and sample selection
techniques to the firm-level data and thus eliminate aggregation and selectivity biases and control
for heterogeneity across firms and over time.Page: 29
A comparison of the investment/capital, investment/labor and investment/production ratios
across thirteen principal ownership/legal-form categories of firms during 1992-98 shows that (the
relatively few) foreign-owned companies generally tend to invest the most and (the domestically
owned) cooperatives the least. Privately owned/joint-stock companies tend to rank after the foreign-
owned firms in terms of their propensity to invest, followed by state-owned/joint-stock companies.
However, the general picture is complex, as some domestic firms dominate foreign ones for some
criteria in some years, and some state-owned firms dominate privately or foreign-owned ones in
some cases. In particular, by 1994 and 1995 state-owned/limited liability companies dominated all
domestic, private firms in terms of the investment/production ratio. Moreover, throughout 1992-98
the privately-owned/limited liability companies (the most numerous group of firms) and private
individually-owned firms tended to invest little relative to their output and employment. The findings
from our large data set hence contrast with the widely accepted findings of the relatively small Polish
survey (Belka et al., 1994), which suggested that investment during the transition was high in the
new private firms and low in the state-owned enterprises.
Our econometric tests based on data from all firms indicate that overall investment behavior
may be approximated by the neoclassical-accelerator model. Estimates for individual types of firms
in turn show that most firms behave consistently with this model and when we estimate on
successive biennial sub-periods of data, we find that the support for the neoclassical-accelerator
model grows over time. More generally, our results are similar to those from western economies in
that we find output to be an important determinant of investment and the investment behavior of
firms in the Czech Republic to be consistent with both the static (neoclassical-accelerator) and
dynamic models of a profit maximizing firm.
The fact that we only find a positive relationship between profit and investment in
cooperatives and to a lesser extent the smaller private firms supports the view that that these firmsPage: 30
encounter financing constraints. However, the lack of a strong positive link between profit and
investment across the broad range of firms casts doubt on the validity of the Calvo-Coricelli
hypothesis that stresses a positive relationship between credit rationing and aggregate investment and
output. In fact, our results suggest that larger firms had virtually unlimited access to capital and in
many years it was the less profitable (more loss making) state and former state-owned firms that
received more bank credit and invested at a higher rate, ceteris paribus, than their more profitable
counterparts. Taken together with the fact that the Czech banks accumulated a large portfolio of non-
performing loans, large firms had a high propensity to invest and by the mid-to-late 1990s many of
them reached the verge of bankruptcy, these findings suggest that throughout the 1990s many large
firms operated under a soft budget constraint.6. References
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Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovak Republic
Year %∆GDP I/GDP %∆GDP I/GDP %∆GDP I/GDP %∆GDP I/GDP
1991 -11.6 0.22 -11.9 0.21 -7.0 0.15 -14.6 0.25
1992 -0.5 0.25 -3.1 0.19 2.6 0.12 -6.5 0.30
1993 0.1 0.28 -0.6 0.18 3.8 0.09 -3.7 0.28
1994 2.2 0.31 2.9 0.20 5.2 0.09 4.9 0.28
1995 5.9 0.34 1.5 0.18 7.0 0.10 6.7 0.31
1996 4.8 0.38 1.3 0.19 6.1 0.11 6.2 0.42
1997 -1.0 0.37 4.6 0.20 6.9 0.12 6.2 0.44
1998 -2.2 0.31 4.9 0.21 4.8 0.14 4.1 0.44
1999 -0.2 0.30 4.5 0.20 4.1 0.14 1.9 0.36
Note: % ∆GDP stands for the annual percentage change in real GDP. Comparable methodology is
used across countries. Investment includes tangible and intangible fixed assets (except for the Czech
Republic, where it includes only tangible fixed assets). With the exception of Poland, all investment
data are for the entire economy, including estimates for entities not directly monitored by the
statistical offices. In Poland, investment reflects entities with more than 20 (50 in industry)
employees. 1998 and 1999 data for Hungarian investment share is preliminary estimate.
Source: EBRD (Transition Report) and CESTAT (Statistical Bulletin of Czech, Hungarian, Polish,
Slovak and Slovenian Statistical Offices), various issues.TABLE 2.—NUMBER OF FIRM-LEVEL OBSERVATIONS BY FIRM OWNERSHIP AND LEGAL FORM
Ownership
Legal Form Private State Cooper. Foreign Mixed Other Total
Joint Stock Company 9091 12170 0 2218 5226 93 28798
State Enterprise (SOE) 0 7154 0 0 0 20 7174
Limited Liability (Ltd.) 28697 616 9 5995 652 88 36057
Cooperative 4 0 5461 0 0 0 5465
Individual 5355 00407 5366
Societé Commandite 261 0 0 256 4 0 521
Subsidized Institutions 0 14 0000 1 4
O t h e r 1 9 1 739 501 0 1 4 4
Total 43427 19971 5473 8568 5882 218 83539
Note:
The shaded cells denote the major ownership/legal form categories of firms that we analyze. All other types of firms are placed in the
Other/Other (other ownership/other legal from) category. Firms with unknown ownership and/or legal form are also included in the
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Standard deviations in parentheses, number of quarterly observations in brackets.






















1992 0.021 0.144 0.015 . 0.031 . . 0.079 0.192 0.104 . . 0.022
(0.034) (0.337) (0.039) (.) (0.120) (.) (.) (0.135) (0.245) (0.322) (.) (.) (0.078)
[619] [28] [1704] [0] [524] [0] [0] [20] [14] [18] [0] [0] [2927]
1993 0.034 0.083 0.012 0.252 0.024 0.166 0.032 0.185 0.291 0.022 0.665 0.029 0.110
(0.262) (0.483) (0.028) (2.842) (0.063) (1.527) (0.086) (0.739) (1.263) (0.071) (2.583) (0.060) (1.576)
[2516] [331] [2395] [2906] [984] [508] [90] [141] [358] [123] [53] [77] [10482]
1994 0.019 0.055 0.009 0.150 0.024 0.089 0.033 0.049 0.167 0.025 0.108 0.076 0.087
(0.054) (0.201) (0.030) (1.450) (0.147) (0.431) (0.106) (0.077) (0.685) (0.066) (0.546) (0.265) (0.938)
[3225] [870] [1186] [5758] [1026] [695] [126] [243] [881] [272] [99] [194] [14575]
1995 0.021 0.062 0.009 0.085 0.018 0.050 0.043 0.040 0.168 0.023 0.112 0.112 0.053
(0.067) (0.378) (0.024) (0.474) (0.033) (0.096) (0.144) (0.089) (0.832) (0.088) (0.295) (0.229) (0.347)
[2859] [836] [479] [2539] [590] [138] [100] [190] [432] [231] [91] [82] [8567]
1996 0.015 0.053 0.010 0.124 0.021 0.055 0.035 0.044 0.165 0.021 0.046 0.112 0.071
(0.029) (0.325) (0.030) (1.947) (0.082) (0.155) (0.063) (0.170) (1.012) (0.076) (0.119) (0.582) (1.111)
[416] [1575] [295] [2593] [534] [123] [80] [420] [649] [1841] [84] [88] [8698]
1997 0.033 0.042 0.024 0.080 0.031 0.155 0.038 0.049 0.138 0.039 0.093 0.111 0.063
(0.081) (0.108) (0.068) (0.271) (0.066) (0.606) (0.061) (0.086) (0.324) (0.172) (0.213) (0.398) (0.220)
[303] [1993] [165] [2314] [446] [139] [73] [481] [699] [1226] [84] [86] [8009]
1998 0.038 0.042 0.031 0.083 0.031 0.123 0.056 0.065 0.141 0.039 0.092 0.054 0.066
(0.091) (0.107) (0.103) (0.442) (0.061) (0.604) (0.081) (0.149) (0.633) (0.141) (0.173) (0.128) (0.336)
[267] [2262] [118] [2243] [424] [190] [59] [489] [886] [1200] [84] [120] [8342]
Total 0.024 0.050 0.013 0.136 0.025 0.114 0.038 0.061 0.167 0.031 0.152 0.080 0.075
(0.140) (0.239) (0.036) (1.594) (0.096) (0.896) (0.098) (0.234) (0.779) (0.125) (0.908) (0.313) (0.919)






















1992 17.1 25.6 10.9 10.2 3.7 8.2 2.9 50.6 22.9 14.3 21.1 9.9 12.9
(68.0) (120.3) (34.8) (74.6) (12.0) (30.9) (7.8) (156.3) (88.2) (38.5) (69.3) (20.7) (62.7)
[2490] [292] [2393] [2079] [959] [393] [78] [124] [261] [117] [34] [64] [9284]
1993 17.4 27.2 9.9 8.8 4.2 7.4 18.8 50.5 29.9 13.3 35.7 10.7 12.8
(47.6) (100.5) (27.4) (32.4) (11.1) (16.9) (69.6) (142.8) (105.7) (41.0) (84.5) (22.4) (46.5)
[2516] [331] [2395] [2906] [984] [508] [90] [141] [358] [123] [53] [74] [10479]
1994 17.4 31.1 7.0 12.7 4.7 13.3 13.5 38.8 38.2 15.7 10.5 19.4 16.0
(48.6) (190.1) (25.8) (69.5) (11.3) (47.6) (66.5) (59.7) (119.7) (34.2) (25.4) (49.5) (76.5)
[3225] [870] [1186] [5758] [1026] [695] [126] [243] [881] [272] [99] [186] [14567]
1995 18.6 27.4 8.1 9.8 5.8 7.3 21 44.2 39.4 17.3 7.5 46.2 17.0
(41.2) (93.4) (21.0) (33.4) (12.0) (21.2) (80.4) (77.6) (86.7) (66.6) (18.7) (86.4) (51.6)
[2859] [836] [479] [2539] [590] [138] [100] [190] [432] [231] [91] [82] [8567]
1996 16.3 21.0 14.2 11.5 5.4 8.6 31.5 50.8 37.0 21.6 4.2 32.8 19.4
(44.0) (64.7) (89.9) (52.4) (12.2) (21.5) (105.8) (88.2) (94.1) (53.2) (7.0) (75.9) (62.1)
[416] [1575] [295] [2593] [534] [123] [80] [420] [649] [1841] [84] [88] [8698]
1997 20.0 22.0 14.7 12.5 5.3 12.6 15.6 43.2 32.7 17.5 8.3 23.0 16.9
(71.9) (75.0) (63.1) (52.7) (14.3) (51.4) (32.1) (81.8) (106.8) (34.6) (22.0) (56.9) (63.5)
[392] [2817] [280] [10355] [927] [3147] [81] [605] [2459] [1395] [200] [251] [22909]
1998 26.3 25.4 10.7 10.9 5.9 9.4 13.9 54.8 40.6 36.3 9.9 19.8 24.5
(63.3) (123.9) (19.4) (39.3) (13.2) (17.0) (23.7) (117.0) (87.8) (139) (24.4) (31.8) (96.6)
[272] [2370] [124] [2321] [431] [208] [61] [495] [934] [1247] [87] [131] [8681]
Total 17.9 24.4 10.0 11.5 4.8 11.5 16.8 47.7 35.1 23.2 11.1 22.9 16.8
(52.6) (107.5) (35.9) (54.5) (12.3) (45.1) (65.8) (99.6) (102.7) (79.4) (35.6) (54.9) (67.2)






















1992 0.176 0.272 0.144 0.124 0.080 0.077 0.029 1.354 0.236 0.403 0.651 0.091 0.165
(1.004) (1.935) (0.744) (1.582) (0.308) (0.309) (0.072) (9.548) (0.791) (2.532) (3.200) (0.315) (1.572)
[2490] [292] [2393] [2079] [959] [393] [78] [124] [261] [117] [34] [64] [9284]
1993 0.139 0.158 0.221 0.097 0.079 0.074 0.144 0.260 0.289 0.075 0.350 0.184 0.145
(0.404) (0.420) (2.747) (0.437) (0.255) (0.205) (0.419) (0.694) (1.346) (0.219) (0.908) (0.472) (1.381)
[2516] [331] [2395] [2906] [984] [508] [90] [141] [358] [123] [53] [81] [10486]
1994 0.132 0.223 0.055 0.127 0.075 0.153 0.25 0.171 0.275 0.103 0.085 0.15 0.136
(0.985) (1.466) (0.170) (1.397) (0.318) (0.788) (2.163) (0.322) (1.179) (0.245) (0.201) (0.395) (1.133)
[3225] [870] [1186] [5758] [1026] [695] [126] [243] [881] [272] [99] [206] [14587]
1995 0.196 0.177 0.072 0.086 0.082 0.057 0.211 0.168 0.242 0.094 0.048 0.278 0.143
(2.606) (0.524) (0.298) (0.473) (0.185) (0.178) (1.142) (0.333) (0.890) (0.291) (0.081) (0.640) (1.560)
[2859] [836] [479] [2539] [590] [138] [100] [190] [432] [231] [91] [82] [8567]
1996 0.107 0.143 0.233 0.061 0.066 0.064 0.164 0.151 0.165 0.128 0.033 0.103 0.112
(0.300) (1.075) (2.386) (0.212) (0.147) (0.144) (0.672) (0.279) (0.422) (0.420) (0.063) (0.167) (0.694)
[416] [1575] [295] [2593] [534] [123] [80] [420] [649] [1841] [84] [88] [8698]
1997 0.096 0.100 0.506 0.085 0.063 0.129 0.06 0.139 0.162 0.100 0.068 0.192 0.109
(0.254) (0.433) (3.132) (0.847) (0.367) (1.226) (0.123) (0.593) (0.662) (0.374) (0.204) (0.915) (0.872)
[392] [2817] [282] [10501] [937] [3290] [81] [605] [2480] [1395] [204] [252] [23236]
1998 0.133 0.082 0.053 0.047 0.053 0.083 0.048 0.134 0.139 0.108 0.040 0.093 0.085
(0.391) (0.240) (0.101) (0.131) (0.108) (0.419) (0.079) (0.304) (0.273) (0.747) (0.091) (0.291) (0.355)
[272] [2370] [124] [2321] [431] [208] [61] [495] [934] [1247] [87] [131] [8681]
Total 0.156 0.129 0.166 0.092 0.073 0.118 0.144 0.222 0.192 0.118 0.113 0.159 0.126
(1.449) (0.795) (1.830) (0.938) (0.278) (1.012) (1.12) (2.306) (0.782) (0.62) (0.793) (0.591) (1.124)
[12170] [9091] [7154] [28697] [5461] [5355] [616] [2218] [5995] [5226] [652] [904] [83539]
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, number of observations in brackets.TABLE 5.—FIXED EFFECT ESTIMATES OF INVESTMENT EQUATION (5) FOR 1992-1998










































































P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.004 0.948 0.003 0.000
Adj.R
2 0.118 0.291 0.166 0.097 0.180 0.373 0.661 0.273 0.252 0.079 0.170 0.290 0.178
N/NF 42483/3805 7884/865 5751/699 3797/501 10899/1254 3635/255 971/159 373/35 1728/149 2372/265 4410/504 305/34 358/46
Note to tables 5, 6, 7, 8, A5, A6, A7, and A8:
Standard errors in parentheses.
Values for 1992 are used for lagged values of regressors only.
*** = significant at 1% level,
** = significant at 5% level,
* = significant at 10% level,
N = number of quarterly observations,
NF = number of firms,
P-value = p-value of the Hausman test of equality of fixed effect and random effect estimates.TABLE 6.—1992-93 FIXED EFFECT ESTIMATES OF INVESTMENT EQUATION (5) BY SIZE AND TYPE OF THE FIRM


























































P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.026 0.008 0.000 0.015 0.991
Adj.R
2 0.133 0.301 0.177 0.109 0.183 0.211 0.251 0.254 0.079 0.177
N/NF 36837/2974 7557/826 5479/671 3036/395 8497/842 2905/174 501/63 1651/140 2018/214 4237/486


























































P-value 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.218 0.027 0.158 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.902
Adj.R
2 -0.024 0.371 0.006 0.088 0.156 0.654 0.756 0.787 0.177 0.035



























































P-value 0.000 0.006 0.396 0.000 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.017 0.080 0.598
Adj.R
2 0.205 0.546 0.212 0.283 0.429 0.313 0.854 0.053 0.379 0.047



























































P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.164
Adj.R
2 0.242 0.314 0.515 0.007 0.197 0.758 0.291 0.500 0.345 0.251



























































P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.607 0.044 0.987 0.004
Adj.R
2 0.101 0.336 0.247 0.650 0.151 0.282 0.241 0.638 -0.004 0.072


























































P-value 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.704 0.099 0.206 0.208 0.000
Adj.R
2 0.094 0.284 0.566 0.490 0.098 0.107 0.485 0.115 0.415 0.725



























































P-value 0.000 0.216 0.000 1.000 0.039 0.000 0.009 0.331 0.000 0.130
Adj.R
2 0.217 0.178 0.291 0.075 0.168 0.455 0.685 0.264 0.413 0.073



























































P-value 0.000 0.636 0.000 0.006 0.019 0.579 0.448 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj.R
2 0.169 0.141 0.194 0.190 0.066 0.380 0.407 0.399 0.541 0.331













Note: *** = significant at 1% level,
** = significant at 5% level,
* = significant at 10% level.
Estimates of the dynamic investment function are based on the entire sample. The specification
includes the inverse Mills ratio (estimated parameter associated with it is denoted µ) to control for
the possible selection bias. Model contained quarterly and ownership/legal form dummy variables
to control for a possible shift across ownership/legal categories (parameter vector Ψ, none of theTABLE A1.—NUMBER AND FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS BY LEGAL STATUS
Legal Form 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
















































































































Note: Relative frequency in % is denoted in squared brackets [] .TABLE A2.—NUMBER AND FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS BY OWNERSHIP

















































































































Note: Relative frequency in % is denoted in squared brackets [] .TABLE A3.—COMPARISON OF INVESTMENT RATIOS BY SIZE OF FIRM
Investment/Capital Investment/Production Investment/Labor
Large Small Large Small Large Small
Time µ σ Nµσ Nµσ Nµσ Nµσ Nµσ N
1992/Q1 0.0140 . 0 3 1 636 0.015 0.052 91 0.110 0.728 1539 0.238 3.140 479 7.3 20.11 539 15.9 145.5 479
1992/Q2 0.017 0.035 620 0.028 0.100 99 0.137 0.686 1623 0.239 4.027 682 11.9 62.8 1623 10.1 66.1 682
1992/Q3 0.018 0.076 635 0.031 0.1511 1 00 . 139 0.503 1655 0.172 1.556 758 11.7 42.4 1655 11.4 67.3 758
1992/Q4 0.030 0.059 620 0.064 0.243 1160 . 198 1.060 1687 0.197 1.291 8611 9.9 63.8 1687 15.2 59.0 861
1993/Q1 0.026 0.210 1611 0.129 1.364 708 0.082 0.252 16130 . 0 7 1 0.315 708 8.4 30.2 1610 6.2 26.7 708
1993/Q2 0.048 0.326 1706 0.248 3.077 9180 . 186 2.016 1706 0.074 0.306 918 14.9 52.6 1706 7.0 26.3 918
1993/Q3 0.098 1.704 1737 0.111 0.595 977 0.197 2.155 1737 0.108 0.738 977 13.0 33.6 1736 9.7 56.0 977
1993/Q4 0.084 0.567 1755 0.271 3.022 1070 0.195 1.397 1757 0.159 0.846 1070 20.7 56.2 1754 14.6 65.11 070
1994/Q1 0.037 0.323 1956 0.111 1.168 1543 0.120 1.336 1960 0.159 2.025 1543 9.4 31.8 1952 14.5 137.0 1543
1994/Q2 0.048 0.347 1979 0.091 0.618 1617 0.098 0.411 1982 0.1130 . 6 14 1617 14.3 43.9 1978 13.8 54.3 1617
1994/Q3 0.069 1.280 2015 0.075 0.349 16190 . 110 0.466 20170 . 106 0.444 1619 14.9 52.9 2014 12.5 40.2 1619
1994/Q4 0.0911 .491 2065 0.184 0.928 1781 0.143 0.345 2068 0.244 1.972 1781 22.2 57.5 2063 25.2 130.5 1781
1995/Q1 0.036 0.222 2061 0.090 0.434 56 0.160 2.930 2061 0.200 0.678 56 12.2 51.4 2061 23.5 82.2 56
1995/Q2 0.049 0.292 2073 0.097 0.535 77 0.129 0.880 2073 0.106 0.288 77 16.0 47.6 2073 18.0 64.6 77
1995/Q3 0.041 0.185 2045 0.026 0.088 103 0.129 0.681 2045 0.080 0.199 103 15.5 42.5 2045 8.9 24.8 103
1995/Q4 0.086 0.561 2039 0.067 0.239 1130 . 154 0.492 2039 0.207 0.816 113 24.5 62.2 2039 15.1 37.9 113
1996/Q1 0.039 0.430 2086 0.120 0.891 83 0.074 0.310 2086 0.075 0.352 83 12.5 37.7 2086 6.2 26.1 83
1996/Q2 0.066 0.533 2067 0.033 0.120 1100 . 102 0.496 2067 0.126 0.911 110 19.7 71.3 2067 6.3 18.6 110
1996/Q3 0.108 2.134 2042 0.050 0.299 138 0.1180 . 8 2 1 2042 0.110 0.508 138 20.1 61.2 2042 5.9 13.0 138
1996/Q4 0.075 0.437 2020 0.039 0.122 152 0.130 0.355 2020 0.438 3.349 152 26.6 64.9 2020 32.11 54.0 152
1997/Q1 0.031 0.185 1871 0.015 0.059 25 0.074 0.335 2354 0.115 1.376 3354 14.4 55.7 2269 10.0 57.0 3354
1997/Q2 0.058 0.203 1959 0.039 0.110 62 0.082 0.343 2308 0.113 1.055 35411 8.3 47.6 2232 12.9 51.9 3541
1997/Q3 0.069 0.224 1957 0.042 0.124 95 0.108 0.562 23100 . 116 0.963 3546 22.1 77.3 2232 13.3 56.2 3546
1997/Q4 0.097 0.266 1931 0.038 0.096 109 0.128 0.354 2302 0.120 0.851 3521 30.9 90.0 2214 20.0 68.9 3521
1998/Q1 0.059 0.428 1804 0.047 0.139 68 0.066 0.217 2099 0.049 0.136 106 17.1 50.7 2099 8.4 24.11 06
1998/Q2 0.058 0.245 2037 0.047 0.240 130 0.073 0.181 2041 0.067 0.295 130 22.1 63.4 20411 8.2 109.6 130
1998/Q3 0.061 0.287 2024 0.040 0.119 147 0.084 0.253 2026 0.060 0.162 147 22.6 76.9 2026 16.9 123.7 147
1998/Q4 0.092 0.395 1975 0.043 0.115 157 0.113 0.248 1975 0.216 2.046 157 37.8 137.9 1975 36.2 294.3 157
Total 0.062 0.742 49326 0.129 1.4211 2274 0.121 0.971 55192 0.135 1.373 28347 18.2 61.7 54838 14.2 76.5 28347
Note: µ denotes sample mean, σ standard deviation, and N number of observations. Large firm has 100 employees or more, small one less than 100 employees.TABLE A4A.—MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND NUMBER OF OBSERVATION OF INVESTMENT/CAPITAL BY TYPE OF
FIRM
Type 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
State/J.Stock 0.021 0.034 0.019 0.021 0.015 0.033 0.038 0.024
(0.034) (0.262) (0.054) (0.067) (0.029) (0.081) (0.091) (0.140)
[619] [2516] [3225] [2859] [416] [303] [267] [10205]
Private/J.Stock 0.144 0.083 0.055 0.062 0.053 0.042 0.042 0.050
(0.337) (0.483) (0.201) (0.378) (0.325) (0.108) (0.107) (0.239)
[28] [331] [870] [836] [1575] [1993] [2262] [7895]
State/SOE 0.015 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.024 0.031 0.013
(0.039) (0.028) (0.030) (0.024) (0.030) (0.068) (0.103) (0.036)
[1704] [2395] [1186] [479] [295] [165] [118] [6342]
Private/Ltd. . 0.252 0.150 0.085 0.124 0.080 0.083 0.136
(.) (2.842) (1.450) (0.474) (1.947) (0.271) (0.442) (1.594)
[0] [2906] [5758] [2539] [2593] [2314] [2243] [18353]
Cooperative 0.031 0.024 0.024 0.018 0.021 0.031 0.031 0.025
(0.120) (0.063) (0.147) (0.033) (0.082) (0.066) (0.061) (0.096)
[524] [984] [1026] [590] [534] [446] [424] [4528]
Private/Individual . 0.166 0.089 0.050 0.055 0.155 0.123 0.114
(.) (1.527) (0.431) (0.096) (0.155) (0.606) (0.604) (0.896)
[0] [508] [695] [138] [123] [139] [190] [1793]
State/Ltd. . 0.032 0.033 0.043 0.035 0.038 0.056 0.038
(.) (0.086) (0.106) (0.144) (0.063) (0.061) (0.081) (0.098)
[0] [90] [126] [100] [80] [73] [59] [528]
Foreign/Ltd. 0.192 0.291 0.167 0.168 0.165 0.138 0.141 0.167
(0.245) (1.263) (0.685) (0.832) (1.012) (0.324) (0.633) (0.779)
[14] [358] [881] [432] [649] [699] [886] [3919]
Foreign/J.Stock 0.079 0.185 0.049 0.040 0.044 0.049 0.065 0.061
(0.135) (0.739) (0.077) (0.089) (0.170) (0.086) (0.149) (0.234)
[20] [141] [243] [190] [420] [481] [489] [1984]
Mixed/J.Stock 0.104 0.022 0.025 0.023 0.021 0.039 0.039 0.031
(0.322) (0.071) (0.066) (0.088) (0.076) (0.172) (0.141) (0.125)
[18] [123] [272] [231] [1841] [1226] [1200] [4911]
Mixed/Ltd. . 0.665 0.108 0.112 0.046 0.093 0.092 0.152
(.) (2.583) (0.546) (0.295) (0.119) (0.213) (0.173) (0.908)
[0] [53] [99] [91] [84] [84] [84] [495]
Other . 0.029 0.076 0.112 0.112 0.111 0.054 0.080
(.) (0.060) (0.265) (0.229) (0.582) (0.398) (0.128) (0.313)
[0] [77] [194] [82] [88] [86] [120] [647]
Total 0.022 0.110 0.087 0.053 0.071 0.063 0.066 0.075
(0.078) (1.576) (0.938) (0.347) (1.111) (0.220) (0.336) (0.919)
[2927] [10482] [14575] [8567] [8698] [8009] [8342] [61600]TABLE A4B.—MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND NUMBER OF OBSERVATION OF INVESTMENT/LABOR BY TYPE OF
FIRM
Type 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
State/J.Stock 17.1 17.4 17.4 18.6 16.3 20.0 26.3 17.9
(68.0) (47.6) (48.6) (41.2) (44.0) (71.9) (63.3) (52.6)
[2490] [2516] [3225] [2859] [416] [392] [272] [12170]
Private/J.Stock 25.6 27.2 31.1 27.4 21.0 22.0 25.4 24.4
(120.3) (100.5) (190.1) (93.4) (64.7) (75.0) (123.9) (107.5)
[292] [331] [870] [836] [1575] [2817] [2370] [9091]
State/SOE 10.9 9.9 7.0 8.1 14.2 14.7 10.7 10.0
(34.8) (27.4) (25.8) (21.0) (89.9) (63.1) (19.4) (35.9)
[2393] [2395] [1186] [479] [295] [280] [124] [7152]
Private/Ltd. 10.2 8.8 12.7 9.8 11.5 12.5 10.9 11.5
(74.6) (32.4) (69.5) (33.4) (52.4) (52.7) (39.3) (54.5)
[2079] [2906] [5758] [2539] [2593] [10355] [2321] [28551]
Cooperative 3.7 4.2 4.7 5.8 5.4 5.3 5.9 4.8
(12.0) (11.1) (11.3) (12.0) (12.2) (14.3) (13.2) (12.3)
[959] [984] [1026] [590] [534] [927] [431] [5451]
Private/Individual 8.2 7.4 13.3 7.3 8.6 12.6 9.4 11.5
(30.9) (16.9) (47.6) (21.2) (21.5) (51.4) (17.0) (45.1)
[393] [508] [695] [138] [123] [3147] [208] [5212]
State/Ltd. 2.9 18.8 13.5 21.0 31.5 15.6 13.9 16.8
(7.8) (69.6) (66.5) (80.4) (105.8) (32.1) (23.7) (65.8)
[78] [90] [126] [100] [80] [81] [61] [616]
Foreign/Ltd. 22.9 29.9 38.2 39.4 37.0 32.7 40.6 35.1
(88.2) (105.7) (119.7) (86.7) (94.1) (106.8) (87.8) (102.7)
[261] [358] [881] [432] [649] [2459] [934] [5974]
Foreign/J.Stock 50.6 50.5 38.8 44.2 50.8 43.2 54.8 47.7
(156.3) (142.8) (59.7) (77.6) (88.2) (81.8) (117.0) (99.6)
[124] [141] [243] [190] [420] [605] [495] [2218]
Mixed/J.Stock 14.3 13.3 15.7 17.3 21.6 17.5 36.3 23.2
(38.5) (41.0) (34.2) (66.6) (53.2) (34.6) (139.0) (79.4)
[117] [123] [272] [231] [1841] [1395] [1247] [5226]
Mixed/Ltd. 21.1 35.7 10.5 7.5 4.2 8.3 9.9 11.1
(69.3) (84.5) (25.4) (18.7) (7.0) (22.0) (24.4) (35.6)
[34] [53] [99] [91] [84] [200] [87] [648]
Other 9.9 10.7 19.4 46.2 32.8 23.0 19.8 22.9
(20.7) (22.4) (49.5) (86.4) (75.9) (56.9) (31.8) (54.9)
[64] [74] [186] [82] [88] [251] [131] [876]
Total 12.9 12.8 16.0 17.0 19.4 16.9 24.5 16.8
(62.7) (46.5) (76.5) (51.6) (62.1) (63.5) (96.6) (67.2)
[9284] [10479] [14567] [8567] [8698] [22909] [8681] [83185]TABLE A4C.—MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND NUMBER OF OBSERVATION OF INVESTMENT/PRODUCTION BY
TYPE OF FIRM
Type 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
State/J.Stock 0.176 0.139 0.132 0.196 0.107 0.096 0.133 0.156
(1.004) (0.404) (0.985) (2.606) (0.300) (0.254) (0.391) (1.449)
[2490] [2516] [3225] [2859] [416] [392] [272] [12170]
Private/J.Stock 0.272 0.158 0.223 0.177 0.143 0.100 0.082 0.129
(1.935) (0.420) (1.466) (0.524) (1.075) (0.433) (0.240) (0.795)
[292] [331] [870] [836] [1575] [2817] [2370] [9091]
State/SOE 0.144 0.221 0.055 0.072 0.233 0.506 0.053 0.166
(0.744) (2.747) (0.170) (0.298) (2.386) (3.132) (0.101) (1.830)
[2393] [2395] [1186] [479] [295] [282] [124] [7154]
Private/Ltd. 0.124 0.097 0.127 0.086 0.061 0.085 0.047 0.092
(1.582) (0.437) (1.397) (0.473) (0.212) (0.847) (0.131) (0.938)
[2079] [2906] [5758] [2539] [2593] [10501] [2321] [28697]
Cooperative 0.080 0.079 0.075 0.082 0.066 0.063 0.053 0.073
(0.308) (0.255) (0.318) (0.185) (0.147) (0.367) (0.108) (0.278)
[959] [984] [1026] [590] [534] [937] [431] [5461]
Private/Individual 0.077 0.074 0.153 0.057 0.064 0.129 0.083 0.118
(0.309) (0.205) (0.788) (0.178) (0.144) (1.226) (0.419) (1.012)
[393] [508] [695] [138] [123] [3290] [208] [5355]
State/Ltd. 0.029 0.144 0.250 0.211 0.164 0.060 0.048 0.144
(0.072) (0.419) (2.163) (1.142) (0.672) (0.123) (0.079) (1.120)
[78] [90] [126] [100] [80] [81] [61] [616]
Foreign/Ltd. 0.236 0.289 0.275 0.242 0.165 0.162 0.139 0.192
(0.791) (1.346) (1.179) (0.890) (0.422) (0.662) (0.273) (0.782)
[261] [358] [881] [432] [649] [2480] [934] [5995]
Foreign/J.Stock 1.354 0.260 0.171 0.168 0.151 0.139 0.134 0.222
(9.548) (0.694) (0.322) (0.333) (0.279) (0.593) (0.304) (2.306)
[124] [141] [243] [190] [420] [605] [495] [2218]
Mixed/J.Stock 0.403 0.075 0.103 0.094 0.128 0.100 0.108 0.118
(2.532) (0.219) (0.245) (0.291) (0.420) (0.374) (0.747) (0.620)
[117] [123] [272] [231] [1841] [1395] [1247] [5226]
Mixed/Ltd. 0.651 0.350 0.085 0.048 0.033 0.068 0.040 0.113
(3.200) (0.908) (0.201) (0.081) (0.063) (0.204) (0.091) (0.793)
[34] [53] [99] [91] [84] [204] [87] [652]
Other 0.091 0.184 0.150 0.278 0.103 0.192 0.093 0.159
(0.315) (0.472) (0.395) (0.640) (0.167) (0.915) (0.291) (0.591)
[64] [81] [206] [82] [88] [252] [131] [904]
Total 0.165 0.145 0.136 0.143 0.112 0.109 0.085 0.126
(1.572) (1.381) (1.133) (1.560) (0.694) (0.872) (0.355) (1.124)
[9284] [10486] [14587] [8567] [8698] [23236] [8681] [83539]TABLE A4D.—MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND NUMBER OF OBSERVATION OF PROFIT BY TYPE OF FIRM
Type 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
State/J.Stock 10906 3686 8966 4951 -3292 1912 -2625 6455
(44336) (56507) (49711) (43289) (63315) (49454) (51527) (49444)
[2490] [2516] [3225] [2859] [416] [305] [272] [12083]
Private/J.Stock 4065 172 5936 2229 913 -1682 -971 480
(12488) (12642) (42895) (47055) (25440) (44554) (40971) (38982)
[292] [331] [870] [836] [1575] [2033] [2370] [8307]
State/SOE 5623 2714 436 631 63 2053 1278 3025
(35536) (38700) (14433) (18792) (21408) (28385) (30842) (32509)
[2393] [2395] [1186] [479] [295] [165] [124] [7037]
Private/Ltd. 1448 984 1603 1700 1320 2320 2239 1631
(5193) (8445) (7314) (15363) (15627) (21337) (16163) (13042)
[2079] [2906] [5758] [2539] [2593] [2394] [2321] [20590]
Cooperative 682 810 925 854 776 647 316 753
(3068) (3859) (6072) (3735) (4361) (4484) (5143) (4492)
[959] [984] [1026] [590] [534] [448] [431] [4972]
Private/Individual 1046 1038 1108 -145 1800 1771 3165 1282
(3747) (4537) (3619) (10295) (8849) (8966) (10128) (6156)
[393] [508] [695] [138] [123] [160] [208] [2225]
State/Ltd. -3163 -7357 292 5531 3181 58 6686 572
(27767) (33794) (28059) (26048) (34323) (23828) (23650) (28877)
[78] [90] [126] [100] [80] [73] [61] [608]
Foreign/Ltd. 1035 -743 2909 9370 4725 4660 7918 4824
(6256) (14476) (20103) (91271) (42954) (46645) (42171) (44774)
[261] [358] [881] [432] [649] [731] [934] [4246]
Foreign/J.Stock 38615 -10485 3253 -8 13270 20316 31951 16842
(319800) (78742) (112464) (98996) (64456) (100242) (144761) (130510)
[124] [141] [243] [190] [420] [483] [495] [2096]
Mixed/J.Stock 3898 2792 5763 -1486 -453 3797 16373 5192
(13127) (9782) (24781) (32455) (66337) (56386) (173041) (99388)
[117] [123] [272] [231] [1841] [1230] [1247] [5061]
Mixed/Ltd. 6801 1171 3098 5560 110 -921 1346 2171
(22005) (15550) (20397) (20082) (9812) (16063) (6937) (16370)
[34] [53] [99] [91] [84] [84] [87] [532]
Other 2104 2027 1807 2771 -2774 -1308 1888 1029
(6462) (6848) (11437) (16598) (25857) (31492) (20023) (18818)
[64] [74] [186] [82] [88] [89] [131] [714]
Total 5548 1733 3511 3048 1377 2603 5476 3326
(47565) (35250) (31071) (40215) (41179) (45156) (79978) (46659)
[9284] [10479] [14567] [8567] [8698] [8195] [8681] [68471]TABLE A4E.—MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND NUMBER OF OBSERVATION OF INVESTMENT BY TYPE OF FIRM
Type 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
State/J.Stock 15888 15640 13021 14516 8531 9942 15667 14307
(60845) (62852) (57018) (48010) (21803) (38451) (42567) (55529)
[2490] [2516] [3225] [2859] [416] [392] [272] [12170]
Private/J.Stock 6361 7130 9031 11373 8945 9301 11754 9870
(23744) (19503) (36900) (43512) (34537) (44828) (58180) (45270)
[292] [331] [870] [836] [1575] [2817] [2370] [9091]
State/SOE 5822 5556 2241 3221 5159 3956 5256 4855
(21019) (19383) (8125) (8505) (22321) (21345) (13635) (18239)
[2393] [2395] [1186] [479] [295] [282] [124] [7154]
Private/Ltd. 1213 986 1227 2244 3968 1325 2751 1698
(6040) (3354) (5694) (6882) (36727) (9034) (9531) (13201)
[2079] [2906] [5758] [2539] [2593] [10501] [2321] [28697]
Cooperative 835 817 804 1290 1288 856 1094 943
(2480) (2152) (2207) (2998) (4381) (3732) (2133) (2907)
[959] [984] [1026] [590] [534] [937] [431] [5461]
Private/Individual 539 632 836 1213 1266 659 1504 732
(2027) (1872) (4014) (3844) (3023) (2789) (2920) (2908)
[393] [508] [695] [138] [123] [3290] [208] [5355]
State/Ltd. 3114 11510 7164 12037 19976 10617 11697 10644
(9257) (37056) (19368) (26944) (46959) (26305) (23226) (29154)
[78] [90] [126] [100] [80] [81] [61] [616]
Foreign/Ltd. 2991 7859 7561 15087 13910 6534 16608 9594
(14275) (28897) (30788) (35100) (40576) (30401) (45657) (34489)
[261] [358] [881] [432] [649] [2480] [934] [5995]
Foreign/J.Stock 34525 53418 49258 51534 51206 29984 43501 42721
(124624) (213238) (269263) (223983) (275671) (161470) (233515) (222757)
[124] [141] [243] [190] [420] [605] [495] [2218]
Mixed/J.Stock 3377 4300 7739 11934 23334 23282 54096 28450
(7395) (11326) (21954) (35173) (98795) (130615) (337721) (188432)
[117] [123] [272] [231] [1841] [1395] [1247] [5226]
Mixed/Ltd. 8219 10860 6969 6889 1284 1176 1583 4076
(23976) (30274) (28591) (19990) (2606) (3070) (3357) (17246)
[34] [53] [99] [91] [84] [204] [87] [652]
Other 1897 4867 8632 10518 8490 3949 5308 6188
(3629) (16360) (44687) (26874) (18828) (12862) (11400) (25459)
[64] [81] [206] [82] [88] [252] [131] [904]
Total 7000 6855 5833 9448 12214 5036 16817 8046
(37336) (42044) (46702) (47618) (81649) (46536) (145045) (66978)
[9284] [10486] [14587] [8567] [8698] [23236] [8681] [83539]TABLE A4F.—MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND NUMBER OF OBSERVATION OF PRODUCTION BY TYPE OF FIRM
Type 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
State/J.Stock 142578 141957 135249 150705 86187 83706 135599 138437
(375564) (378323) (384889) (403516) (153078) (186799) (267196) (373715)
[2490] [2516] [3225] [2859] [416] [392] [272] [12170]
Private/J.Stock 59391 54104 69140 80336 87291 97386 128621 96713
(116413) (98033) (187588) (176629) (126945) (260840) (310869) (237814)
[292] [331] [870] [836] [1575] [2817] [2370] [9091]
State/SOE 65888 64561 37294 50778 60846 42631 74259 58712
(141962) (141483) (65591) (72823) (83474) (76875) (104843) (123843)
[2393] [2395] [1186] [479] [295] [282] [124] [7154]
Private/Ltd. 19469 17077 17756 36820 49114 20794 58807 26763
(28438) (25314) (27419) (51071) (79193) (40448) (151963) (60966)
[2079] [2906] [5758] [2539] [2593] [10501] [2321] [28697]
Cooperative 12519 12074 12806 17565 20721 14314 24256 15074
(14172) (15165) (23978) (23683) (25485) (24079) (34950) (22767)
[959] [984] [1026] [590] [534] [937] [431] [5461]
Private/Individual 10815 10813 9923 23349 23696 8968 39826 11310
(18746) (17044) (13967) (18695) (24173) (14945) (40947) (18583)
[393] [508] [695] [138] [123] [3290] [208] [5355]
State/Ltd. 127080 100830 99866 175273 197915 195070 277653 158552
(149747) (117098) (116022) (193357) (171974) (186052) (380656) (197821)
[78] [90] [126] [100] [80] [81] [61] [616]
Foreign/Ltd. 16335 26799 34041 93559 108212 49600 137059 67642
(40967) (83701) (99953) (169963) (273064) (147938) (255135) (181028)
[261] [358] [881] [432] [649] [2480] [934] [5995]
Foreign/J.Stock 285600 305212 239548 392872 323431 308884 462700 344030
(1173448) (1361490) (946759) (1453467) (1242255) (1650641) (2319878) (1646144)
[124] [141] [243] [190] [420] [605] [495] [2218]
Mixed/J.Stock 63994 56282 104716 126977 221921 237980 429202 257937
(100773) (81129) (235028) (260082) (569664) (686926) (1197414) (774373)
[117] [123] [272] [231] [1841] [1395] [1247] [5226]
Mixed/Ltd. 42369 35043 64032 67426 65966 30130 53829 49300
(103762) (84967) (107974) (100699) (80526) (40154) (41510) (78027)
[34] [53] [99] [91] [84] [204] [87] [652]
Other 28448 31705 38917 54203 84085 47313 90487 53127
(26250) (40254) (103841) (62447) (77919) (68048) (129659) (87850)
[64] [81] [206] [82] [88] [252] [131] [904]
Total 69701 63871 55286 93606 112212 54062 164945 78877
(255983) (260700) (235106) (337186) (402473) (340953) (758786) (383870)
[9284] [10486] [14587] [8567] [8698] [23236] [8681] [83539]TABLE A4G.—MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND NUMBER OF OBSERVATION OF CAPITAL BY TYPE OF FIRM
Type 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
State/J.Stock 1147293 765972 769048 861261 674812 496171 555251 799529
(4861470) (2740927) (2502764) (2652614) (1429215) (1114462) (1045057) (2719397)
[619] [2516] [3225] [2859] [416] [303] [267] [10205]
Private/J.Stock 62736 203725 416240 470169 341596 344611 307605 347689
(105557) (372792) (1533437) (1674807) (718970) (886058) (707130) (1004758)
[28] [331] [870] [836] [1575] [1993] [2262] [7895]
State/SOE 459370 421117 260720 368715 438226 354351 357787 395322
(1034318) (1080279) (597589) (779283) (965855) (912901) (987455) (963420)
[1704] [2395] [1186] [479] [295] [165] [118] [6342]
Private/Ltd. . 39496 38646 79382 93506 62415 61918 58008
(.) (75350) (86412) (137152) (230062) (112077) (132320) (132127)
[0] [2906] [5758] [2539] [2593] [2314] [2243] [18353]
Cooperative 48491 44734 52638 69461 70105 49634 39012 53119
(96339) (55851) (85148) (63638) (67763) (50432) (34673) (70203)
[525] [984] [1026] [590] [534] [446] [424] [4529]
Private/Individual . 20092 22098 64276 58564 43692 47397 31632
(.) (56301) (46751) (90729) (71270) (62173) (95273) (64930)
[0] [508] [695] [138] [123] [139] [190] [1793]
State/Ltd. . 493687 444242 606978 544241 327335 277849 463886
(.) (626102) (714432) (789343) (560188) (423771) (339263) (632554)
[0] [90] [126] [100] [80] [73] [59] [528]
Foreign/Ltd. 8475 72698 93440 245203 232490 234691 224611 185847
(7369) (214736) (249823) (459766) (476173) (452881) (420370) (400182)
[14] [358] [881] [432] [649] [699] [886] [3919]
Foreign/J.Stock 2072876 720781 829128 1233792 1148891 866447 804315 943342
(4076611) (2269763) (2732066) (3695920) (3236288) (2676871) (2335857) (2840291)
[20] [141] [243] [190] [420] [481] [489] [1984]
Mixed/J.Stock 158174 246800 515908 645744 1176970 841232 1243745 1020840
(162959) (433743) (1537579) (1759961) (3493970) (2717722) (7050661) (4348004)
[18] [123] [272] [231] [1841] [1226] [1200] [4911]
Mixed/Ltd. . 118985 173084 172850 122009 71495 42995 119266
(.) (339109) (384854) (465551) (246429) (151550) (75617) (313823)
[0] [53] [99] [91] [84] [84] [84] [495]
Other . 420550 110536 126426 217200 199500 178717 188423
(.) (1503744) (263267) (129832) (275663) (243543) (204941) (568774)
[0] [77] [194] [82] [88] [86] [120] [647]
Total 534351 325637 271841 450535 472320 340551 380839 370325
(2422355) (1502388) (1352447) (1787343) (1881692) (1388965) (2799057) (1832438)
[2928] [10482] [14575] [8567] [8698] [8009] [8342] [61601]TABLE A4H.—MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND NUMBER OF OBSERVATION OF LABOR BY TYPE OF FIRM
Type 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
State/J.Stock 1142 1030 809 830 483 367 451 895
(2925) (2612) (1918) (1872) (608) (572) (570) (2242)
[2490] [2516] [3225] [2859] [416] [392] [272] [12170]
Private/J.Stock 458 399 428 497 405 359 429 409
(647) (572) (970) (930) (447) (654) (673) (694)
[292] [331] [870] [836] [1575] [2817] [2370] [9091]
State/SOE 553 503 279 335 343 232 417 453
(936) (870) (378) (301) (312) (283) (698) (778)
[2393] [2395] [1186] [479] [295] [280] [124] [7152]
Private/Ltd. 152 133 122 244 258 100 241 150
(209) (170) (166) (251) (344) (175) (331) (227)
[2079] [2906] [5758] [2539] [2593] [10355] [2321] [28551]
Cooperative 216 183 161 209 203 129 195 181
(167) (145) (143) (106) (104) (101) (99) (135)
[959] [984] [1026] [590] [534] [927] [431] [5451]
Private/Individual 88 86 83 201 161 50 157 72
(136) (113) (112) (169) (91) (36) (58) (86)
[393] [508] [695] [138] [123] [3147] [208] [5212]
State/Ltd. 1175 908 730 851 749 669 780 831
(1140) (946) (764) (696) (493) (508) (927) (812)
[78] [90] [126] [100] [80] [81] [61] [616]
Foreign/Ltd. 105 170 150 364 305 144 337 209
(135) (445) (358) (658) (426) (283) (462) (396)
[261] [358] [881] [432] [649] [2459] [934] [5974]
Foreign/J.Stock 907 809 742 916 721 557 689 704
(3017) (2813) (2242) (2390) (1702) (1550) (1837) (2002)
[124] [141] [243] [190] [420] [605] [495] [2218]
Mixed/J.Stock 417 382 483 572 988 924 1049 914
(768) (667) (693) (691) (2211) (2202) (2228) (2074)
[117] [123] [272] [231] [1841] [1395] [1247] [5226]
Mixed/Ltd. 340 263 367 439 334 164 253 285
(780) (617) (555) (586) (316) (217) (238) (448)
[34] [53] [99] [91] [84] [200] [87] [648]
Other 233 221 132 203 274 142 257 189
(250) (237) (129) (85) (236) (163) (180) (185)
[64] [74] [186] [82] [88] [251] [131] [876]
Total 557 465 332 505 479 202 453 384
(1688) (1445) (1041) (1233) (1169) (700) (1086) (1160)
[9284] [10479] [14567] [8567] [8698] [22909] [8681] [83185]TABLE A4I.—MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND NUMBER OF OBSERVATION OF MONTHLY WAGE BY TYPE OF FIRM
Type 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
State/J.Stock 4.64 5.75 6.56 7.68 9.03 10.48 11.65 6.59
(1.01) (1.29) (1.58) (1.79) (2.46) (4.06) (3.25) (2.32)
[2490] [2516] [3225] [2859] [416] [392] [272] [12170]
Private/J.Stock 4.80 5.93 6.95 7.84 8.99 10.50 11.31 9.52
(1.30) (1.64) (2.19) (2.37) (2.50) (3.14) (3.06) (3.31)
[292] [331] [870] [836] [1575] [2817] [2370] [9091]
State/SOE 4.47 5.43 6.07 7.29 8.69 10.03 11.19 5.75
(0.95) (1.17) (1.39) (1.61) (2.07) (2.42) (2.97) (2.04)
[2393] [2395] [1186] [479] [295] [280] [124] [7152]
Private/Ltd. 4.59 5.61 6.39 7.24 8.50 9.98 10.62 8.09
(1.29) (1.58) (1.85) (1.85) (2.14) (3.36) (2.84) (3.25)
[2079] [2906] [5758] [2539] [2593] [10355] [2321] [28551]
Cooperative 3.80 4.63 5.25 6.15 7.08 7.91 8.57 5.87
(0.95) (1.12) (1.30) (1.53) (1.88) (2.36) (2.58) (2.30)
[959] [984] [1026] [590] [534] [927] [431] [5451]
Private/Individual 4.46 5.14 5.84 6.98 7.65 8.43 9.89 7.47
(1.38) (1.43) (1.70) (2.25) (1.90) (2.97) (3.92) (3.04)
[393] [508] [695] [138] [123] [3147] [208] [5212]
State/Ltd. 4.89 6.43 7.37 9.13 11.59 12.56 13.80 9.07
(0.68) (0.97) (1.30) (1.54) (2.81) (2.17) (2.44) (3.41)
[78] [90] [126] [100] [80] [81] [61] [616]
Foreign/Ltd. 4.92 6.14 7.21 8.93 10.08 11.53 12.85 10.14
(1.42) (1.68) (2.26) (3.32) (3.72) (4.78) (4.59) (4.63)
[261] [358] [881] [432] [649] [2459] [934] [5974]
Foreign/J.Stock 5.47 6.87 8.31 9.62 11.05 13.02 14.19 11.29
(1.72) (2.00) (2.46) (3.46) (3.36) (4.19) (4.18) (4.47)
[124] [141] [243] [190] [420] [605] [495] [2218]
Mixed/J.Stock 4.68 5.78 7.24 8.09 8.89 10.21 11.53 9.58
(1.13) (1.18) (2.56) (1.84) (2.08) (2.46) (2.94) (2.86)
[117] [123] [272] [231] [1841] [1395] [1247] [5226]
Mixed/Ltd. 4.66 5.69 7.08 8.39 9.09 9.87 11.76 8.77
(0.95) (1.27) (2.48) (2.28) (2.45) (3.16) (3.17) (3.27)
[34] [53] [99] [91] [84] [200] [87] [648]
Other 4.81 5.81 7.05 8.39 10.38 10.77 11.91 9.03
(1.49) (1.83) (2.43) (2.88) (3.73) (4.43) (4.32) (4.19)
[64] [74] [186] [82] [88] [251] [131] [876]
Total 4.52 5.54 6.45 7.58 8.90 10.03 11.36 7.99
(1.15) (1.43) (1.88) (2.12) (2.58) (3.58) (3.48) (3.45)
[9284] [10479] [14567] [8567] [8698] [22909] [8681] [83185]Appendix
TABLE A5.—COMPLETE FIXED EFFECT PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE BASIC INVESTMENT EQUATION FOR 1993-1998





























































































































































































































































































































P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.004 0.948 0.003 0.000
Adj.R
2 0.118 0.291 0.166 0.097 0.180 0.373 0.661 0.273 0.252 0.079 0.170 0.290 0.178
N/NF 42483/3805 7884/865 5751/699 3797/501 10899/1254 3635/255 971/159 373/35 1728/149 2372/265 4410/504 305/34 358/46TABLE A6.—COMPLETE FIXED EFFECT PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE BASIC INVESTMENT EQUATION BY SIZE AND TYPE OF THE FIRM























































































































































































































































P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.026 0.008 0.000 0.015 0.991
Adj.R
2 0.133 0.301 0.177 0.109 0.183 0.211 0.251 0.254 0.079 0.177
N/NF 36837/2974 7557/826 5479/671 3036/395 8497/842 2905/174 501/63 1651/140 2018/214 4237/486





















































































































































































































































P-value 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.218 0.027 0.158 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.902
Adj.R
2 -0.024 0.371 0.006 0.088 0.156 0.654 0.756 0.787 0.177 0.035
























































































































































































































































P-value 0.000 0.006 0.396 0.000 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.017 0.080 0.598
Adj.R
2 0.205 0.546 0.212 0.283 0.429 0.313 0.854 0.053 0.379 0.047




































































































































































































































P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.164
Adj.R
2 0.242 0.314 0.515 0.007 0.197 0.758 0.291 0.500 0.345 0.251




































































































































































































































P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.607 0.044 0.987 0.004
Adj.R
2 0.101 0.336 0.247 0.650 0.151 0.282 0.241 0.638 -0.004 0.072




































































































































































































































P-value 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.704 0.099 0.206 0.208 0.000
Adj.R
2 0.094 0.284 0.566 0.490 0.098 0.107 0.485 0.115 0.415 0.725
























































































































































































































































P-value 0.000 0.216 0.000 1.000 0.039 0.000 0.009 0.331 0.000 0.130
Adj.R
2 0.217 0.178 0.291 0.075 0.168 0.455 0.685 0.264 0.413 0.073
N/NF 6975/1861 297/76 1691/460 162/44 1913/522 440/112 70/19 462/118 543/147 1191/306
1998








































































































































































































































P-value 0.000 0.636 0.000 0.006 0.019 0.579 0.448 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj.R
2 0.169 0.141 0.194 0.190 0.066 0.380 0.407 0.399 0.541 0.331
N/NF 6651/1799 242/64 1746/475 97/28 1775/484 400/103 113/35 455/119 629/172 1015/271THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
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